Are All Ratings Created Equal? The Impact of Issuer Size on the Pricing of Mortgage-backed Securities by Jie (Jack) He et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
ARE ALL RATINGS CREATED EQUAL? THE IMPACT OF ISSUER SIZE ON THE










Corresponding author: Strahan. We appreciate helpful comments from Cam Harvey (editor), an associate
editor, two anonymous referees, Efraim Benmelech, Patrick Bolton, Gerard Hoberg, Chris James,
Brian Quinn, Joel Shapiro, Richard Stanton, Dragon Tang, James Vickery, and seminar/session participants
at Boston College, Brigham Young University, DePaul University, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, London School of Economics, Northwestern University, Queen’s University (Canada), Simon
Fraser University, University of Florida, University of Maryland, American Economic Association
meetings (Denver), China International Conference in Finance (Beijing), European Finance Association
meetings (Frankfurt), and the NBER conference on securitization.  We thank Calvin Chau, Hugh Kirkpatrick,
Sailu Li, Yingzhen Li, and Chenying Zhang for excellent research assistance and Boston College and
University of Georgia for financial support. The authors are responsible for all the remaining errors.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2011 by Jie (Jack) He, Jun 'QJ' Qian, and Philip E. Strahan. All rights reserved. Short sections of
text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.Are All Ratings Created Equal? The Impact of Issuer Size on the Pricing of Mortgage-backed
Securities
Jie (Jack) He, Jun 'QJ' Qian, and Philip E. Strahan
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As the most severe financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression unfolds, 
scholars, practitioners, and regulators have been studying its causes and possible cures to prevent 
similar future crises.  At the center of the crisis is the growth of the mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) market, which is both fueled by and fueling the housing market boom.  In this paper, we 
study the role of the three main rating agencies—Moody’s, S&P and Fitch—in the expansion of the 
MBS market.  We examine whether conflicts of interest play a role in the growth of MBS, and 
whether and when the market begins to realize this problem.  Specifically, did the rating agencies 
grant large MBS issuers, who brought substantial business, unduly favorable ratings? 
Rating agencies play an important role in fixed income securities markets, in part because 
they have access to private information.  Access to such information is protected from regulations 
such as Reg-FD, and ratings themselves are incorporated into regulations of many financial 
institutions.  Abundant evidence shows that credit ratings contain information not imbedded in 
prices for corporate bonds, and Jorion, Zhu, and Shi (2005) show that the impact of rating changes 
on stock prices becomes stronger after Reg-FD.  Ratings are also shown to be an important 
determinant for corporate decisions such as capital structure (e.g., Kisgen, 2006). 
Rating agencies, however, have come under criticism for practices that may have spurred 
undue expansion and then collapse of the MBS market.  Many critics emphasize a potential conflict 
in the way agencies structure their fees.  Instead of being compensated by the ‘consumers’ (e.g., 
institutional investors) for producing high-quality ratings, issuers themselves pay the agencies.  The 
conflict of interest hypothesis thus stipulates that rating agencies may grant more favorable ratings 
to issuers who may be able to bring, or potentially take away, substantial future business.  In 
addition, regulations contingent on ratings may further distort incentives of both issuers and rating 
agencies, since holding highly rated MBS securities lowers the burden of capital requirements.         2
The risk of lost reputation weighs against potential conflicts of interest for the rating 
agencies.  As recent theoretical work shows, however, several forces may have tilted toward rating 
‘inflation,’ especially for large MBS issuers.  Unlike corporate bonds, a small number of large 
issuers of MBS bring many deals to the ratings agencies and thus may have greater bargaining 
power than large bond issuers (e.g., Frenkel, 2010).  Perverse incentives of the rating agencies 
worsen during market booms, when the short-term benefits of additional rating business net of 
potential reputational costs are the highest (e.g., Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro, 2009; Bar-Isaac and 
Shapiro, 2010).  Moreover, more complicated MBS tranches are packaged and sold during 2004-
2006, thereby increasing ratings disagreement.  Disagreement increases issuers’ incentive to ‘shop 
for better ratings,’ even if each rating agency truthfully reports its findings, because an issuer can 
purchase and report the most favorable rating(s) after receiving preliminary opinions from multiple 
agencies.  Shopping thus leads to inflated ratings (e.g., Mathias, McAndrews, and Rochet, 2009; 
Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009).  To summarize, the booming housing and MBS markets between 
2004 and 2006, with the associated growth in revenues for rating agencies and increased complexity 
of deals, may have worsened conflicts of interest and pushed toward leniency.  These facts and 
arguments provide the basis of our empirical tests. 
We match price histories, initial yields, and ratings from Moody’s, S&P and Fitch for a large 
sample of privately issued (non-GSE-backed) MBS between 2000 and 2006 with information on the 
market share of issuers.
1  We also obtain information on the characteristics of the tranches (e.g., size 
of principal amount, weighted average life, geographical distribution of the underlying mortgages) 
as well as other issuer characteristics (e.g., issuer type and rating at the issuance date).  Our tests are 
based on cross-sectional differences between tranches sold by large issuers vs. small issuers, where 
                                                           
1 Throughout most of our sample period there were just four Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations 
(NRSROs) – Moody’s, S&P, Fitch, and DBRS, who achieved NRSRO status in 2003. However, DBRS focused almost 
exclusively on the corporate bond market (Kisgen and Strahan, 2010).   3
issuer size is based on the issuing institutions’ (one-year) lagged annual market shares.  We also 
differentiate market boom years, where we expect cross-sectional differences between large and 
small issuers to be the greatest.   
In our first set of tests, we compare the fraction of a deal financed at AAA for large vs. small 
issuers.  More favorable ratings imply a greater fraction of financing in the highly-rated tranches 
(i.e. the AAA slice), which implies greater leverage and higher risk across all tranches within a deal.  
The median fraction of financing in AAA tranches sold by large and small issuers is quite similar in 
2000 (just above 96% for the median deal), but then trends downward for both groups of securities 
as the housing and MBS markets grow.  More importantly, we observe divergence in the degree of 
subordination—deals sold by large issuers have a larger fraction rated AAA than those sold by 
small issuers; the gap increases over time and peaks in 2006, the height of the boom.   
Even with a large set of control variables, we cannot observe every aspect of collateral 
quality; nor can we observe the full set of dimensions used by the credit ratings agencies 
themselves.  If large issuers receive inflated ratings, they may be more inclined to place poor 
collateral into MBS than small issuers.  Focusing on AAA subordination thus runs into an omitted-
variable problem that will attenuate the effect of issuer size on subordination (since collateral 
quality is negatively correlated with issuer size).  To sidestep this concern, we examine whether 
investors recognize and price the risk that larger issuers receive inflated ratings.  We thus compare 
initial yields (ex ante credit quality) of tranches sold by large vs. small issuers, conditional on the 
credit rating.  This yield spread is about 10% higher on tranches sold by large issuers than that of 
similarly rated tranches issued by small issuers during market boom years.  The effect is similar in 
both AAA and non-AAA markets, suggesting that investors are skeptical even of tranches receiving 
the highest possible rating.  Coefficients translate into an increase in yields of about 15 basis points 
(relative to a mean spread of 147 basis points) for large-issuer tranches.  We find no significant   4
difference in yield spreads, however, during non-boom years.  This result implies that investors 
recognize that conflicts of interest worsens during booms, leading to compromise in the rating 
process, and accordingly demand a price discount on the large-issuer tranches.  These results are 
robust to the inclusion of issuer fixed effects.  
We also obtain a number of interesting results on how the market prices MBS tranches.  For 
example, more ratings equate to lower yields.  Specifically, non-AAA tranches with one rating have 
yields about 9% higher than those rated by all three agencies, while those with two ratings have 
yields about 4% higher.  This suggests that investors price the risk that issuers ‘shopped for the best 
rating’ when tranches have fewer than three ratings.  By shopping, an issuer could ‘censor’ out 
pessimistic ratings, thus reducing the number of ratings observed by investors.
2  Consistent with this 
incentive, we also find that tranches issued where ratings agencies disagree have initial yield 
spreads that are 10% higher than that of tranches receiving the same rating across multiple agencies.  
The credit rating process, beyond conflicts related to the issuer-pay fee structure, may also 
have been distorted by financial institutions’ attempts to exploit ‘regulatory arbitrage’ opportunities.  
For example, banks could reduce required capital by transforming mortgages (held in the banking 
book) to highly rated MBS held in the trading book (Acharya and Richardson, 2009).  In addition, 
in July, 2004 the U.S. bank and thrift regulators exempted depository institutions from FASB rule 
‘Fin 46,’ which had forced consolidation of most securitized assets onto the balance sheet in the 
aftermath of the Enron scandal.  This ruling allowed depositories to create ‘shadow banks,’ off-
balance sheet conduits holding long-term securitized assets financed with short-term asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP).  These structures reduced the capital requirement to zero, while leaving 
all of the risk with the issuing banks, who typically provided the conduits with liquidity guarantees 
to facilitate the sale of the ABCPs (Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez, 2011).  Following this decision, 
                                                           
2 For tranches with more than one rating (which is most of the sample), we define it has AAA (highest) rating only if all 
of the ratings are AAA (or equivalent).   5
the ABCP market boomed, with outstandings rising from about $600 billion in July 2004 to its peak 
of $1.2 trillion by the summer of 2007.  We find that MBS issued by depositories following the July 
2004 decision had yields about 15% higher than average.  We also find higher yields on AAA-rated 
tranches of more complex deals, proxied by the number of tranches (Furfine, 2010), as well as a 
trend increase in deal complexity during 2004-2006.  Overall, both increasing deal complexity as 
well as regulatory arbitrage did seem to distort the rating process and markets (Opp, Opp and 
Harris, 2011).  Controlling for both effects, however, changes neither the magnitude nor the 
significance of the effect of issuer size on yields. 
In our final set of tests, we examine the ex post performance of MBS securities by looking at 
price changes between origination and April, 2009.  Both AAA- and non-AAA rated tranches sold 
by larger issuers in the boom perform worse than similar tranches sold by smaller issuers − during 
boom years, prices for these large-issuer tranches drop about 10% more than similar tranches sold 
by small issuers.  (This result is robust to the inclusion of issuer fixed effects for the non-AAA rated 
tranches only.)  In addition, we find price changes are attenuated slightly when we control for the 
initial yield, suggesting that markets rationally incorporate concerns about the ratings process into 
ex ante pricing. 
Our paper contributes to the literature on the role of credit ratings in the financial crisis.  
Prior work has examined lending practices as a potential cause for the run-up in house prices (e.g., 
Keys, Mukerjee, Seru, and Vig, 2010; Mian and Sufi, 2009; Loutskina and Strahan, 2010).  Several 
papers empirically examine credit ratings in structured finance markets (e.g., Ashcraft, Goldsmith-
Pinkham, and Vickrey, 2009; Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2009a, 2009b; Adelino, 2009; Demiroglu 
and James, 2010; Griffin and Tang, 2009; Nadauld and Sherlund, 2009).  These studies find that 
ratings are not always accurate measures for default risk; nor are they a sufficient statistic for risk.  
Adelino (2009) shows that yield spreads add incremental explanatory power beyond ratings in   6
forecasting defaults.  Griffin and Tang (2009) document flaws in how rating agencies use their 
internal models, and Ashcraft et al. (2009) show that simple observable measures of collateral risk 
forecast default conditional on the credit rating in a sample of Alt-A and subprime MBS.  Our paper 
is the first to test for incentive problems related to issuer size, and whether the market incorporates 
concerns about the integrity of the rating process into ex ante pricing and ex post performance.   
Prior research has also examined conflict of interest facing financial institutions such as 
investment banks (e.g., Kisgen, Qian, and Song, 2009) and subprime lenders (e.g., Alexander, 
Grimshaw, McQeen, and Slade, 2002), but studies of conflicts facing rating agencies have focused 
mainly on the corporate bond market (e.g., Bongaerts, Cremers and Geotzmann, 2010; Becker and 
Milbourn, 2010).  Our work shows that conflicts may be exacerbated in new and booming markets 
such as MBS, and also that investor wariness of this problem affects prices.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section II we review the evolution of the 
MBS markets and discuss our hypotheses and tests.  We then introduce our data on MBS securities 
in Section III and present results from our empirical tests in Section IV.  We conclude in Section V. 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF CREDIT RATINGS AND MBS MARKETS 
Prior research has documented that rating agencies play a key role in the traditional 
corporate bond market.  Credit ratings are perhaps more important in the recently developed 
markets for structured finance products, including MBS securities, for several reasons.  For one, the 
cash flows and risks of corporate bonds are tied to the performance and prospects of one company.  
By contrast, structured finance involves a complicated securitization process, with pooling and 
tranching of credit-sensitive assets.  For a fixed collateral pool (in the case of MBS these would be 
home mortgages), structured finance separates payments to investors into prioritized claims called 
‘tranches,’ which absorb losses from the underlying portfolio following seniority.  Hence, ratings   7
depend on the quality of the collateral, the seniority and degree of subordination of the tranche.  
While securitization has revolutionized fixed income markets and brought billions of dollars to 
investment banks, for many investors this process can be opaque and tainted by asymmetric 
information and moral hazard problems.
3  To the extent that uninformed investors trust the rating 
agencies to assess these complicated securities, credit ratings likely play a more important role for 
investors than in the corporate bond market, where independent research is more feasible.   
There is also strong demand among various types of institutional investors.  For pension 
fund managers focusing on the fixed income markets and seeking high returns but constrained by 
the level of risk, highly rated MBS tranches offer an ideal vehicle.  The securitization process 
described above can produce many more AAA-rated tranches than the fraction of AAA-rated 
corporate bonds (just one percent of which are AAA rated).  The pooling and tranching process 
eliminates most of the idiosyncratic risk of the underlying assets, while the remaining systematic 
risk leads to higher expected returns (Coval, Jurek and Stafford, 2009a).  For banks, broker dealers, 
and insurance companies, credit ratings affect the amount of capital needed to hold in reserve.  
Seemingly safe AAA-rated structured finance products also expand the supply of collateral to back 
repurchase agreements that many money market mutual funds use to manage their liquidity risk 
(Gorton and Metrick, 2010).   Moreover, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased huge volumes of 
AAA-rated structured MBS that they could finance at below-market borrowing rates due to their 
special status as government-sponsored enterprises. 
For rating agencies, the new fixed income products emerging out of the growth of structured 
finance provide substantial revenue potential beyond their traditional market of corporate bonds.  
The total volume of originations of subprime mortgages, for example, rose from $65 billion in the 
                                                           
3 See, e.g., Coval et al. (2009b) for a review of structured finance, and Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) for a review of 
potential problems of the securitization process.  See Keys et al. (2009) for evidence that securitization led to lax 
screening by lenders.   8
late 1990s to over $600 billion in 2006.  In the case of Moody’s, profits tripled between 2002 and 
2006.  At the peak of the market, Moody’s disclosed that 44 percent of their revenues came from 
rating structured finance products, exceeding the 32 percent earned from rating corporate bonds.  
There is also direct evidence that rating agencies offer price discounts for large and frequent issuers 
of corporate bonds.
4  It is natural to expect that such practice also exists in dealing with large issuers 
of structured finance products including MBS.  As pointed out above, issuance is more highly 
concentrated in structured finance, with large financial institutions such as banks and investment 
banks being key players.  This concentration implies that some large issuers have substantial 
bargaining power as they can bring, and certainly take away, rating business.  The confluence of 
tremendous new revenue flows in the late 2000s with significant bargaining power of large issuers 
thus worsened the conflict of interest problem inherent in the agencies’ issuer-pay fee structure.
5  
Our main hypotheses are that credit rating agencies favored large issuers over small ones, 
and that this effect grew stronger as the market boomed.  In the context of structured finance and a 
given pool of mortgages, more favorable ratings imply a greater fraction of financing in the highly-
rated tranches (i.e. the AAA slice), which in turn implies greater risk across all tranches within a 
deal.  Ratings shopping may also compromise the integrity of the rating process.  Issuers sometimes 
receive preliminary opinions to determine whether or not to purchase a rating.  Shoppers will tend 
to ‘censor’ out pessimistic ratings, thus leading to inflated purchased and observed ratings, 
regardless of whether rating agencies truthfully convey their own information.  The direct impact of 
                                                           
4 According to S&P’s disclosure reports (including rating fee structure) in 2008, S&P stated that corporate issuers 
typically pay “up to 4.25 basis points for most transactions” and that the minimum fee is $67,500. In addition, “S&P 
will consider alternative fee arrangements for large volume issuers and other companies that want multi-year ratings 
services agreements” (Standard and Poor’s 2008).  Also see Becker and Milbourn (2009) for more details on the 
practice of rating agencies in the corporate bond market.  
 
5 Rating agencies have also been criticized for using models that tend to overestimate the likelihood of rising and high 
levels of housing prices, and thus underestimate the default risk of MBS securities. Our focus is not on the accuracy of 
these rating models per se, but rather on whether and how the market ‘prices’ MBS securities issued by large vs. small 
issuers differently due to the possible conflict of interest problem.     9
ratings shopping is not observable, since issuers are not required to disclose all the contacts they 
have made with rating agencies (see, Sangiorgi and Spatt, 2010, for more details).  We do, however, 
control for the potential effects of shopping by including the number of reported ratings and rating 
disagreement among multiple agencies.  Finally, given the significant benefits of packaging and 
holding highly rated MBS securities, we examine whether ratings-based regulations further alter the 
incentives of both issuers and rating agencies.  For example, institutions facing tighter regulations 
may securitize their assets more aggressively, which lead to differences in deal structure, collateral 
quality and pricing. 
We build a large sample of non-GSE-backed MBS tranches issued during the period 2000-
2006, matched to characteristics of their issuers.  As discussed above, we take a ‘valuation from 
outside’ approach to examine our main hypotheses—whether and when investors and markets 
recognize the potential problems in the ratings process.  For example, investors may have initially 
failed to distinguish the credit quality of similarly-rated tranches based on issuer size.  Later on, as 
the housing market began to unwind, investors may have begun to recognize the difference in these 
two groups and adjusted yields accordingly.   
We conduct three sets of tests.  First, we study how deal structures vary with issuer 
characteristics.  MBS deals are complex and heterogeneous, but the fraction of financing sold at 
AAA offers the simplest measure of the degree of credit-rating leniency.  If large issuers have more 
bargaining power than small ones do, then they ought to place more financing into the AAA 
tranches.  This approach, however, assumes that the quality of the collateral pool itself is not 
correlated with issuer size.  If large issuers put lower quality collateral into their deals – which is 
what we would expect if they receive more inflated ratings – then the effect of size will be biased 
toward zero.  Since we do not have the full set of collateral controls in our dataset, we view this first 
test as suggestive rather than definitive.  Second, we examine whether investors and the market   10
recognize potential ratings inflation when they price tranches at issuance, conditional on the credit 
rating.  We compare the yields (at issuance) on securities sold by large vs. small issuers.  If the 
market believes large issuers receive differential treatment from ratings agencies, then their tranches 
ought to have higher credit risk (due to more aggressive subordination structures and/or riskier 
underlying collateral) and thus command higher initial yields.  Third, we study the post-issuance 
performance of these two groups of securities by looking at their (cumulative) price changes 
between origination and April, 2009.  If large issuers enjoy favorable ratings and the market does 
not fully price this into initial yields, then securities they sell ought to perform worse than otherwise 
similar securities sold by small issuers when the market turns in 2007.  Taken together, these three 
sets of results should give us a much better idea on how the adverse incentive problem may affect 
the quality of ratings during one of the worst crises in history.  
 
III. DATA AND METHODS 
  We begin the process of data compilation with the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) 
database, which provides a large sample of tranches of privately-issued (i.e. non GSE) MBS deals.  
For each deal, SDC provides the basic information on asset/collateral types (mortgage, credit card, 
auto loans, bonds, etc), the number of tranches, as well as information on the issuer(s) and 
bookrunner(s).  For other deal and tranche characteristics, including initial and subsequent ratings 
and prices, principal amount, coupon type and rate, and maturity (weighted average life, and 
whether the tranche is paid off prior to April 2009), we rely on manually collected data from 
Bloomberg.  Our sample includes MBS deals originated and issued in 2000 through 2006, and we 
follow the prices of these deals through April of 2009.   
III.1 Empirical Models   11
  We estimate three sets of models relating issuer size and market conditions to: 1) deal 
structure, measured by the dollar-weighted fraction financed at AAA; 2) yield spreads at issuance; 
and, 3) price change from the issuance date to April 2009.  The key explanatory variables are the 
lagged market share of the issuer (Issuer Share) and its interaction with HOT, defined as the 
fraction of total principal amount of all tranches issued in a given year over the total amount issued 
across all years.  These models reflect three stages in the life of each MBS security: in the first 
stage, a deal is structured and rated; in the second, the tranches of each deal are sold to investors; 
and in third, ex post outcomes occur.  The credit rating and deal structure are thus predetermined 
variables in stages 2 and 3 and may be used as explanatory variables; similarly, the ex ante yield is 
predetermined in stage 3.   
  To summarize, we estimate three sets of models with the following structure: 
 Fraction AAAi,t = β
1Issuer Sharek,t-1 + γ
1Issuer Sharek,t-1× Hott + Collateral and Issuer controls  + 
 e
1
i,t             ( 1 )  
Ln Yield Spreadi,j,t = β
2Issuer Sharek,t-1 + γ
2Issuer Sharek,t-1× Hott + Initial Rating, Fraction AAA 
  (subordination level), Collateral and Issuer controls + e
2
i,j,t     ( 2 )  
 Price Changei,j,t = β
3Issuer Sharek,t-1 + γ
3Issuer Sharek,t-1× Hott + Initial Rating, Fraction AAA 
  (subordination level),  Ln Yield Spread, Collateral and Issuer controls + e
3
i,j,t    (3) 
The data vary by year (t), issuer (k), deal (i) and tranche (j).  In the first set of models, estimated at 
the deal level, we only include controls for the collateral in the pool, characteristics of the issuer, 
and characteristics of the market.  In analyzing pricing (model 2), estimated at the tranche level, we 
add variables related to deal structure (e.g. the Fraction AAA, or, for non-AAA tranches, the level of 
subordination).  In our third set of models, also estimated at the tranche level, we then introduce 
Yield Spread as a regressor.  These three models have a triangular structure in which each   12
endogenous variable feeds into the next variable in the system.  There are no two-way feedbacks, at 
least not in a mechanical sense.  For example, Ln Yield Spread does not enter the Fraction AAA 
model because the pricing of a security (tranche) occurs after the deal has been structured.  Thus it 
is appropriate to estimate the three equations sequentially using standard OLS techniques.
6  We do, 
however, also report Equations (2) and (3) in their ‘reduced forms’ – that is, without including 
Fraction AAA (and other deal structure terms) in (2) and without deal structure terms and Yield 
Spread in (3) – to estimate the total impact of issuer size on yields and price changes.   
  In all of our tests, we include issuance-year fixed effects, and we double-cluster for all 
tranches sold by the same issuer and in the same year to build standard errors.
7  Note that by 
including the issuance-year effects, we absorb the direct effect of HOT, which has only time 
variation but no cross-sectional variation; hence, we only report its interaction with issuer size.  We 
also report all of our models with and without issuer fixed effects. 
III.2 Variable Construction and Summary Statistics 
We obtain ratings from the largest three rating agencies, Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch.  There 
are more tranches rated by S&P than Moody’s or Fitch, but even Fitch rates over half of the 
tranches.  Each of the three agencies rates around 60% of all the tranches AAA, but the AAA-rated 
tranches are larger and constitute about 90% of the total amount of financing.   
Dependent Variables 
Table 1, Panel A reports summary statistics for the overall sample.  The dependent variable 
in model (1), Fraction AAA, equals the total principal amount of all the AAA tranches in an MBS 
                                                           
6 We acknowledge that issuers (with cooperation from ratings agencies) may put together deals in anticipation of market 
demand for various types of structures.  Absent a set of identifying instruments, it is not possible to trace out all of the 
possible interactions among these three variables.  
 
7 To estimate the double-clustered standard errors by issuer and cohort year, we use the Stata code “cgmreg.ado,” 
downloaded from Doug Miller's website: http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/dlmiller/statafiles/. This program is used 
to run OLS and do multi-way clustering as described in Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2006).   13
deal divided by the total principal amount of all rated tranches in the deal.  Among the 5,548 deals 
that we have information on the principal amount of all the tranches, an average of 89% of the 
dollar value is rated AAA (median is 94%).  We have two sets of market-based variables to measure 
ex ante pricing and ex post performance (models 2 and 3).  Ln Yield Spread equals the log of yield 
spread of a tranche at issuance.  For a tranche with a floating coupon rate, yield spread is defined as 
the fixed mark-up, in basis points (bps), over the reference rate specified at issuance (e.g. the 1-
month LIBOR rate).  For a tranche with a fixed or variable coupon rate, yield spread is defined as 
the difference between the initial coupon rate and the yield on a Treasury security whose maturity is 
closest to the tranche’s weighted-average life.  The mean yield spread was 147 bps over the whole 
sample; since there are on average 15 tranches per deal, the sample for this variable grows to more 
than 65,000 (only about 2/3 of these observations end up in the regression due to missing values on 
other dimensions).  Price Change equals the percentage change in the price of an MBS tranche 
between issuance and April 2009 (or its payoff date).  This sample is considerably smaller than the 
yield sample because Bloomberg only provides pricing history for the larger deals.
8  About 45% of 
the 9,299 tranches that we have information on pricing history are paid off early and before the 
crisis, and so the median price drop is only 0.8% while the mean drop is about 15%.   
Issuer Characteristics 
Our key explanatory variable of interest, Issuer Share, equals the number of MBS deals sold 
by an issuer over the total number of deals sold by all issuers in the previous year (using alternative 
measures of issuer market share based on the principal amounts yields very similar results).  We 
denote market boom years through the continuous variable HOT, which varies from 5% in 2000 to 
its peak of 25% in 2006.  We are interested in testing whether the effect of issuer size changes when 
                                                           
8 Comparing the subsample of tranches with pricing information with the whole sample, we can see that large tranches 
(principal amount) are more likely to have price information from Bloomberg, which reports prices as the mid-quote 
(bid-ask) from security dealers.   14
markets boom, so we introduce the interaction variable, Issuer Share × HOT.  
Since the value of implicit recourse to investors may increase with issuer reputation, we 
control for the issuer rating, equal to the numerical score for the rating of the issuer at the issuance 
date (AAA=1; AA+=1.67, AA=2, AA-=2.33, and so on); the mean issuer has an A rating.  In our 
tests we also differentiate issuer types (Panel B, Table 1), and include an indicator equal to one for 
banks and thrifts, who face tighter regulatory capital requirements than other MBS issuers such as 
finance companies (e.g. GMAC) or investment banks (e.g. Bear Stearns, Lehman, etc.).  If 
regulatory arbitrage encourages the regulated banks to securitize their assets more aggressively, 
then there may be differences in deal structure, collateral quality and pricing.  We also interact the 
regulatory indicator with a time indicator equal to one after July 2004, when the regulators 
exempted banks and thrifts from FASB rule FIN46 by allowing them to move assets into securitized 
conduits financed with ABCP.  This regulatory decision led to a doubling of this financing 
mechanism – an increase of about $600 billion in the outstanding amount – over just three years.  
We also construct Same Originator Servicer, an indicator set to 1 if the originator and the servicer 
of the tranche are owned by the same firm and 0 otherwise. (Same Originator Servicer is also only 
available for a subset of our data; hence we estimate our models with an additional indicator, 
Missing Originator Servicer, equal to one if the information on originator and servicer is not 
available.) 
Deal Structure 
In our second and third sets of models, we control for the credit rating and deal structure.  
Initial Rating equals a numerical score based on the average of the ratings a tranche received at 
issuance.  In the regressions, we estimate the AAA-rated sample separately from the sample of non-
AAA tranches, and in the latter sample control for the rating with separate indicators for each 
distinct category based on the average score across ratings.  This non-parametric strategy allows us   15
to avoid imposing any functional relationship between the rating and pricing.  As our main measure 
of deal structure, we add the Level of Subordination (Panel A) for each tranche, defined as the 
dollar-weighted fraction of tranches in the same deal that have a rating the same as or better than the 
given tranche.
9  For example, for a hypothetical $100 million deal with $80 million in the AAA 
tranche, $10 million in the BBB tranche and another $10 million in the B tranche, the Level of 
Subordination would equal 80% for AAA, 90% for BBB and 100% for B.  This variable increases 
as the amount of protection for a given tranche by lower rated tranches decreases; this variable 
equals the Fraction AAA – the dependent variable from equation (1) – for the AAA-rated tranches.   
Opp, Opp, and Harris (2011) show theoretically and Furfine (2011) empirically that more 
complex deals may lead to greater ratings inflation.  To control for this mechanism, we add the log 
of the number of tranches within the deal.  We also control for deals with floating-rate-coupon 
tranches with an indicator variable.  In addition, we control in some models for the number of 
ratings on a deal, using an indicator equal to 1 for deals with one rating and another equal to 1 for 
deals with two ratings.  Issuers can pressure rating agencies by soliciting a preliminary opinion 
before deciding whether or not to purchase a rating.  Hence they may drop lower ratings after 
shopping their product to an agency.  Thus, deals with just one or two ratings are more likely to 
have been shopped than those with three.  Some deals with two or three ratings may also have been 
shopped, forcing the ratings to converge.  But not all deals are shopped; we know some are issued 
with multiple ratings where the agencies disagree.  We control for this effect by adding another 
indicator for deals with more than one rating in which the ratings differ.   
Collateral  
We include a number of control variables to capture characteristics of the underlying 
collateral.  From Panel A, Principal amount equals the dollar value of the tranche; its distribution is 
                                                           
9 We are only able to observe tranches that receive ratings and are sold to investors. Thus, we cannot control for 
additional support provided by sponsors in unrated equity tranches, for example.    16
highly skewed, with the mean $65 million and median only $14 million.  Weighted-average life, 
equal to the expected timing of payments of principal of a tranche, is also skewed with the mean 5.6 
years.
10  Fraction of collateral in troubled states equals the fraction of collateral originated in 
Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada.  This variable measures the degree of exposure to areas 
that experienced the highest rise leading up to the crisis followed by the largest drop during the 
crisis.
11  HHI of Collateral measures geographical concentration of the collateral pool, equal to the 
sum of the squared shares of the collateral within a deal across each of the top five states (with the 
largest amount of mortgages), with the aggregation of all the other states as the sixth category. 
Sample Description 
Table 1, Panel B describes the ratings distribution.  Moody’s and S&P both have similar 
market presence, rating more than 51,000 tranches, while Fitch rates nearly 35,000.  The majority of 
tranches receive two (66%) or three ratings (14%), while almost 20% of the tranches have only one 
rating.  Among tranches with two or three ratings, we observe disagreement about 13% of the time.  
For about 65% of the tranches the same financial institution acts as both originator and servicer.  
Commercial banks are the most prevalent issuers, with about 39% of the deals, followed by 
investment banks (22%), thrifts (20%), finance companies (9%), and others (10%).  
Panel C of Table 1 sorts the tranches into cohorts based on issuance year and issuer size.  
For these simple comparisons, “Big” issuer refers to those with market shares in the top 10% among 
all issuers (of a given year), and “Small” refers to all others.  Not surprisingly, the volume of 
tranches, in terms of principal amount, is much greater during the housing market boom of 2004-
2006.  In our regressions below, we compare the characteristics of the two groups of MBS tranches 
                                                           
10  Note that this is not the same as duration that measures the weighted-average time to maturity based on the relative 
present values of cash flows as weights (see, e.g., Ch. 27 of Saunders and Cornett, 2008, for more details). 
 
11 We realize that the importance of this variable may be obvious only in hindsight, although some analysts were 
concerned about overheated regional markets in real time; nevertheless, all of our key findings are robust to the 
exclusion of this variable from our models.   17
issued by large vs. small issuers across this boom period vs. the earlier sample period (2000-2003) 
by interacting market share of issuers with the (continuous) variable HOT as defined above.  We 
report results excluding the tranches issued in 2007, as the housing and MBS markets clearly 
entered into a new regime as compared to the previous booming period.
12   
From Panel C, tranches sold by small issuers appear to be larger in size and shorter in terms 
of weighted-average life, which tend to be safer, than those sold by large issuers.  Tranches sold by 
small issuers also have less exposure to troubled states and are better diversified (lower HHI).  The 
numerical values of ratings indicate that tranches sold by small issuers receive worse ratings (e.g., 
initial rating has a higher mean and median) than those from large issuers, especially during the 
boom years of 2004-2006.  On the other hand, small issuers themselves tend to have slightly better 
ratings than large issuers at the issuance date.  MBS deals sold by large issuers also have less 
subordination — that it, a greater fraction of the deal receiving AAA rating — than those sold by 
small issuers.  Further, MBS deals put together by both small and large issuers have a significantly 
greater number of tranches during the boom period (more complexity), but deals from large issuers 
have more tranches than those from small issuers during both periods.  
Tranches from small issuers are less likely to have a single rating and more likely to have 
ratings from all three agencies than tranches sold by large issuers.  Perhaps not surprisingly, there is 
more disagreement (defined only for tranches with multiple ratings) during the boom years, given 
the large volume of risky deals sold in this period.  But, as with levels of subordination, the gap in 
disagreement widens during the boom.  During 2004-2006, for example, tranches sold by small 
issuers received different ratings 21% of the time, compared to just 14% of the time for large-issuer 
                                                           
12 According to the financial crisis timeline of the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis, in February 2007, Freddie Mac 
announces that it will no longer buy the most risky subprime mortgage and mortgage-related securities; in April 2007, 
New Century Financial Corp., a leading subprime mortgage lender, files for Ch. 11 bankruptcy; in June 2007, S&P and 
Moody downgrade over 100 bonds backed by second-lien subprime mortgages, and Bear Stearns informs investors that 
it is suspending redemptions from its High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund. All of these 
events suggest that the housing and MBS markets began to deteriorate in early 2007. When we include the 2007 
observations in pooled regressions we obtain qualitatively similar results.   18
tranches.  These comparisons suggest that large issuers shopped deals across the agencies more 
aggressively than smaller issuers.  Finally, large issuers are more likely to act as both the originator 
and the servicer of a deal, who collects interest payments after issuance.  Small issuers, on the other 
hand, are more likely to sell deals with different servicers from the originators.  This difference may 
in part reflect economies of scale at large mortgage banks such as Washington Mutual (WaMu).  
However, servicers may be unwilling to accept their role for tranches with high default risks; thus, 
having a different servicer from originator may provide a ‘check and balance’ system when issuing 
the security.   
Overall, these simple comparisons indicate that the quality of tranches issued by small 
issuers appears to be better than those sold by large issuers, despite receiving lower ratings on 
average.  Moreover, large issuers seem to shop more for ratings – they are more likely to have one 
rating; and when they do have multiple ratings these ratings are more likely to agree.  This 
difference is strongest during the boom years.   
Table 2 reports the top ten issuers in each year of our sample period.  The ranking for an 
institution in a given year is based on the number of deals issued during the year and information 
collected by SDC.
13  While the list of top ten issuers changes over time, most if not all institutions 
on the lists are the well-known, largest institutions involved in various aspects of housing and 
subprime lending.
14  Interestingly, the top six issuers in 2006, Countrywide, GM (through its 
finance arm GMAC), Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, IndyMac, and WaMu all failed during the 
ensuing crisis.  Moreover, Citigroup, the ninth largest issuer, received a large capital injection 
through the TARP program.  The bottom row illustrates that the MBS market is highly concentrated 
                                                           
13 Note that in Table 2 issuer rankings and market shares are based on the number of deals (not weighted by deal size) 
sold in the current year, whereas in regression models below we use lagged market shares (from the previous year).  
 
14 We also rank bookrunners, or lead underwriters of the MBS securities, in each year.  This list reflects the largest 
underwriters of structured finance products during this period, and overlaps with the list of largest issuers.  We find (not 
reported) that the impact of ratings on the performance of tranches mostly comes through large issuers, not bookrunners.   19
among large issuers, in that the top ten issuers account for 55% to 68% of all the newly issued 
securities each year over our sample period.  As discussed above, the dominance of large issuers 
implies that they have considerable bargaining power over rating agencies.         
 
IV. REGRESSIONS RESULTS 
  Tables 3-5 report the three sets of estimates of Equations (1)-(3).  In Table 3 we regress 
Fraction AAA (Eq. 1) on characteristics of the deals, the issuer, and the market.  In analyzing ex 
ante pricing—the yield spread at issuance in Table 4 (Eq. 2), estimated at the tranche level, we add 
variables related to deal structure (e.g. the Fraction AAA, or, for non-AAA tranches, the level of 
subordination) and tranche characteristics.  Finally, we examine price change in Table 5 (Eq. 3), 
also estimated at the tranche level, and we introduce the initial Yield Spread as a regressor.  In all 
three tables we report specifications both with and without issuer fixed effects. 
Deal Structure (Fraction AAA rated) 
Figure 1 plots the median fraction of AAA tranches of MBS, sorted by issuing year and 
issuer size.  “Big issuer” indicates that the market share falls into the top 10% of the market share 
distribution in a given year, while “Small issuer” refers to the other issuers in the same year.  The 
median fraction of financing in AAA tranches sold by large and small issuers is quite similar in 
2000 (just above 96% for the median deal), but then trends downward for both groups of securities 
as the housing and MBS markets grow.  More importantly, we observe a divergence in the degree of 
subordination between deals sold by large vs. small issuers—deals sold by large issuers have a 
larger fraction rated AAA than those sold by small issuers.  The gap increases over time, peaking at 
about 10 percentage points in 2006, the height of the boom.  
The patterns from Figure 1 are confirmed in Table 3.  In both panels, the first two columns 
omit the issuer credit rating because this variable is not available for all of our observations.  We   20
find consistent support for a positive link from issuer size to Fraction AAA in the models without 
fixed effects (columns 1, 3 & 5).  The interaction with HOT, however, is only significant in models 
that exclude the issuer rating (column 2).
15  In terms of magnitudes, the coefficient suggests that an 
issuer with 10% market share would have about 1.5%−2% more financing at AAA rates relative to 
a small issuer.  That is, deals packaged by large issuers are sold with greater leverage.  There is no 
evidence that regulated banks and thrifts issue more levered deals than other financial institutions, 
either before or after the regulatory ruling relaxing FIN 46 in July of 2004.  We also find that 
Fraction AAA increases as an issuer’s credit rating deteriorates, which may reflect stronger 
incentive for lower-rated issuers to engage in aggressive securitization as an alternative to on-
balance-sheet financing. 
  Panel B of Table 3 reports the results with issuer fixed effects.  In these models, we find no 
significance remains for any of the issuer-level variables.  This approach, however, probably ‘over 
controls’ for issuer characteristics and clearly loses power because much of the variation in issuer 
size does not change over time.  The fixed effects sweep out time-invariant common factors within 
an issuer and thus reduce concerns about unobserved heterogeneity.  The problem with this strategy 
is that much of the variation in issuer size persists over time, and the issuer effects will take out this 
variation.  (Recall Table 2: Countrywide, Lehman and GM appear in the Top 10 in every year.) 
  Ratings seem more aggressive among deals put together by large issuers, at least in the 
model without issuer fixed effects.  This finding suggests greater inflation in the ratings process 
with issuer size, but these deal-level models may miss some important variation in collateral 
quality.  In the ideal experiment, one would compare two identical collateral pools and vary only 
issuer size.  This experiment is impossible to run for two reasons.  First, we do not have as complete 
a description of the collateral pool as the rating agencies.  Second, if conflicts of interest have 
                                                           
15 Griffin and Tang (2010) focus on the subordination level of a sample of CDOs and find evidence that ratings were 
more favorable on average than what would have come from a strict application of the agency’s models.   21
indeed distorted the integrity of the rating process in ways that favor large issuers, then collateral 
quality would likely worsen with issuer size.  Large issuers would have greater ability than small 
issuers to securitize poor-quality collateral, implying a negative correlation between issuer size and 
the residual in model (1).  In fact, we see evidence of this in Table 1 above – recall that small-issuer 
deals had larger tranches and shorter maturity, were less focused on the troubled states, and were 
better diversified than large-issuer deals.  If large-issuer deals are riskier on observables, then it 
seems reasonable that they may also be riskier on unobservable dimensions.  Thus, the effects of 
issuer size on deal structure ought to be attenuated toward zero. 
Yield Spread at Issuance 
  We next ask whether the market ‘prices’ the risk of agency problems – the risk of large-
issuer deals.  If larger issuers exert greater bargaining power, yield spreads ought to be positively 
correlated with issuer size conditional on the credit rating.  Since the credit rating ideally acts as a 
sufficient statistic for risk (absent agency problems), it is less important to condition on the full set 
of pool characteristics in this setting, compared to the approach in Equation (1).  Thus, we compare 
how initial yields vary with issuer size controlling for the distribution of ratings (ratings indicators, 
the number of ratings and a disagreement indicator).  Since most of the securities are priced and 
sold at par, initial yield spreads gauge the market’s assessment of ex ante credit quality (i.e., risk). 
  Figure 2 presents suggestive evidence by plotting initial yield spreads for tranches sold by 
large vs. small issuers.  As mentioned earlier, for a tranche with a floating coupon rate, yield spread 
is the fixed mark-up (in bps) over the benchmark rate; for a tranche with a fixed or variable coupon 
rate, yield spread is the difference between the initial coupon rate and the yield of a Treasury 
security whose maturity is closest to the tranche’s weighted average life.  Tranches with all ratings 
are again sorted and grouped by their issuance year (cohort), and we plot the median initial yield 
spread for each cohort of the two groups of tranches during 2000-2006.  Figure 2 shows that yields   22
on tranches sold by large issuers consistently exceed yields from small issuers, with the average 
difference about 18 bps.  The gap in the yield spreads is the largest during the market boom period 
of 2004-2006 with the difference in 2004 over 37 bps.  
Table 4 tests whether the patterns in Figure 2 hold up after controlling for the initial rating of 
the tranche using a full set of indicators for each unique value of the average rating.  Columns (1) 
and (2) control for collateral and issuer characteristics (reduced forms), and in the subsequent 
columns we add variables related to deal structure: the Level of Subordination (the dependent 
variable from Eq. (1) in the AAA sample); One Initial Rating and Two Initial Rating indicators (to 
test for ‘shopping’); Rating Disagreement (=1 for tranches with multiple ratings that disagree); and 
the Log of Number of Tranches (a proxy for deal complexity).  The dependent variable equals the 
natural log of the yield spread calculated at the issuance date.  We split the sample into AAA-rated 
tranches (AAA-rated by all ratings) vs. all non-AAA rated tranches, and we also include dummy 
variables for coupon types (floating, fixed, or variable; not reported in tables). 
  Panel A Table 4 reports the yield results for AAA-rated tranches without issuer fixed effects.  
This model exploits cross-sectional as well as within-issuer time variation in market share.  The 
yield on tranches sold by large issuers is on average higher than that on tranches sold by small 
issuers during boom years.  The coefficient from the baseline model (column 1, Panel A) is positive 
but not significant, but in column (2) we find a strong interaction between issuer size and market 
conditions.  In a hot year such as 2006 (when HOT = 0.25), the yield spread would be about 13% 
higher for an issuer with a 10% market share (such as Countrywide or GM) relative to a very small 
issuer (-1.23×0.1 + 9.8987×0.25×0.1 = 12.6%).  This effect translates into a 19 bps increase in 
yields, somewhat smaller than the unconditional comparisons in Figure 2. 
 The  Level of Subordination enters the yield spread regressions with a very strong positive 
coefficient, although its inclusion does little to the effects of issuer size; nor does it interact with   23
market conditions (HOT).  Increasing this variable from the 25
th to 75
th percentile of its distribution 
would increase yield spreads by about 5%.  This makes sense because the Level of Subordination 
represents the degree of leverage in the tranche, so greater leverage implies greater risk and thus 
higher yields.  We also find some evidence that regulatory distortions affected the ratings process.  
During the post-July 2004 period, tranches issued by banks and thrifts had yield spreads 10-15% 
higher than issues sold by less regulated entities.  This may reflect their greater incentive to 
securitize more aggressively to lower the effect of regulatory capital requirements. 
  Panel B of Table 4 reports the same set of models but includes issuer fixed effects.  We find 
the effects of issuer size (through interactions with HOT) are somewhat smaller but remain 
statistically significant.  Magnitudes are only slightly smaller, despite the large decline in the 
interaction term, because the linear term switches sign.  The yield spread would be about 10% 
higher for an issuer with a 10% market share relative to a very small issuer (0.38×0.1 + 
2.623×0.25×0.1 = 10.4%), vs. 13% from the model without fixed effects.  The effects of 
subordination and the regulatory indicators are also similar.  Interestingly, the effect of issuer rating 
enters the fixed effects model with a positive coefficient, suggesting that declines in an issuer’s 
credit standing are priced into deals that they sell, perhaps because the value of implicit recourse 
falls as issuer credit quality declines (Gorton and Souleles, 2010).  This effect only emerges in the 
fixed effects specification, however.  We also find that the yield on tranches for which the same 
institution acts as originator and servicer is higher than that on tranches with different originator and 
servicer, and this result is robust to the inclusion of issuer fixed effects. 
  We also obtain a number of interesting results on how the market ‘prices’ certain MBS 
tranches.  For example, we find that the yield on AAA-rated tranches included in deals with a 
greater number of tranches is higher in both panels, indicating that investors are suspicious of the 
quality of more complicated deals.  The coefficient in column 3, Panel A implies that as the number   24
of tranches in a deal doubles (the 25
th percentile of this variable is 8 while the 75
th percentile is 19), 
the yield on the AAA tranche increases by a little more than 10%.  This result is consistent with 
theories of rating inflation based on regulation arbitrage (Opp et al., 2011) and asset complexity 
(Mathias et al., 2009; Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009), controlling for the effect of deal complexity, 
however, does not change the link from issuer size to yield spreads.  We also find tranches with a 
greater fraction of their underlying mortgages originated from ‘troubled’ states (AZ, CA, FL, and 
NV) have higher yields (though not significant with issuer fixed effects).  Interestingly, we find that 
better-diversified AAA-rated deals, as measured by the cross-state HHI, have higher yields (again 
only without fixed effects).  This result supports the model of Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009a), 
who show that AAA-rated structured-finance deals with a high degree of diversification act like 
‘economic catastrophe bonds’ that would default only under dire economic scenarios.  Thus, such 
bonds must offer high yields to compensate investors for bearing systematic risk.   
  For the non-AAA rated tranches (Panels C & D), we find similar results for issuer size as in 
the AAA market.  The magnitudes are a bit smaller in the models without fixed effects, and a bit 
larger in the models with fixed effects.  Increasing issuer share from very small to 10% during a hot 
year would increase yield spreads by almost 10% (-1.04×0.1 + 7.91×0.25×0.1 = 9.8%) based on 
column 2 of Panel C.  In the models with fixed effects the magnitude increases to 17% (0.27×0.1 + 
5.92×0.25×0.1 = 17.5%).  The variables related to ratings shopping enter the non-AAA market with 
similar magnitude but greater statistical significance, compared to the AAA market.  We find 
tranches with one rating have yields about 7% higher than those with all three ratings (the omitted 
group); and the tranches with two ratings have yields about 5% higher than the omitted group.  
Rating disagreement also enters the model very significantly – tranches with disagreement have 
10% higher spreads – suggesting that there may be a large payoff to ratings shopping, since 
shopping would conceal the lower rating from investors.  What remains an interesting open question   25
is why all deals are not shopped – perhaps for a relatively unknown issuer, the benefit of reporting 
multiple (all 3) ratings, even if they disagree, is greater than reporting only one rating or two ratings 
that are similar.
16 
  Overall, the results across Table 4 suggest that the market prices the risk of large-issuer 
sponsored deals, conditional on the credit rating, during the housing boom.  The positive effect of 
issuer size during the boom is robust to including controls for regulatory arbitrage, to unobserved 
heterogeneity across issuers, and to various dimensions of deal structure, including the level of 
subordination.  The level of subordination itself is strongly correlated with yields, suggesting that 
the market suspects the integrity of the rating process, yet adding this variable does little to our 
main finding.  In fact, the magnitudes are almost completely unaffected by all of these controls 
(other than the issuer fixed effects).  This suggests that what drives the relationship between issuer 
size and yields comes from the heterogeneity in the quality of the collateral backing these securities 
– lower quality collateral is associated with increasing issuer size − and helps explain why we do 
not find a strong relationship between Fraction AAA and issuer size in Table 3.   
Ex Post Price Performance 
Figure 3 presents some simple, unconditional graphical evidence on our third test — price 
change after issuance — for the two groups of securities.  Once again, for all the tranches, the initial 
price is set at par—$100 per $100 face value, or very close to $100.
17  We group tranches by their 
issuance year (cohort); Figure 3(a) plots the median cumulative price change for all tranches in the 
2000-2003 cohorts from the first month after issuance until April 2009 (or the last reported price), 
                                                           
16 Ratings disagreement is undefined for the AAA sample because we only include tranches rated AAA by all the 
agencies that rated the tranche. 
 
17 As indicated earlier, about 45% of the 9,299 tranches that we have information on pricing history are paid off early 
and before the crisis. Once they are paid off, the ratings are withdrawn and reported price series stop.  Note that these 
bonds do not experience bankruptcy when the underlying assets become distressed due to the special legal status of the 
‘Special Purpose Vehicles.” Instead, actual and expected future cash flows fall, leading to a decline in the price.   26
while Figure 3(b) plots the median price change for the 2004-2006 cohorts.  Prices in all the cohorts 
from both figures remain more or less flat during the first few years after issuance, but begin to drop 
early in 2007.  From Figure 3(b), prices of tranches issued during the market booming period of 
2004, 2005, and 2006 and by large issuers dropped by 54% from the issuance date, as compared to a 
37% drop by small issuers, a difference of 17 percentage points between these two groups.   
Table 5 reports regressions testing whether the patterns in Figure 3 continue to hold after 
adding control variables.  As in Table 4, we start with ‘reduced form’ models that control for 
collateral, issuer characteristics and include the full set of credit rating indicators (columns 1 and 2). 
We then add deal structure variables (columns 3-6), and last we add the ex ante log yield spread 
variable (column 7).  Adding the yield spread allows us to test the extent to which the market 
‘priced’ the risk of large-issuer deals.  That is, if markets price this risk, then the effect of issuer size 
ought to be attenuated or even eliminated in its ability to predict outcomes.  The dependent variable 
is price change, for which we have one observation per tranche, calculated as the percentage change 
between the price during the first month after issuance and the final price as of April, 2009 (if 
available) or the last available monthly price otherwise.  As noted earlier, the sample is considerably 
smaller than our sample of initial yields (Table 4) because Bloomberg only provides a pricing 
history on a subset of the tranches.   
As in Table 4, Table 5 again separates results into the AAA-rated tranches with and without 
issuer fixed effects (Panels A & B) vs. all other tranches (Panels C & D).  We find a negative and 
significant impact of issuer size for both samples during boom years, although not in the AAA 
sample with issuer fixed effects.  The coefficients from the baseline models suggest that tranches 
sold by large issuers fell by about 10 percentage points more than those sold by small issuers in the 
AAA market during boom years (from Panel A, column 2: 0.296×0.1 − 5.26×0.25×0.1 = −10%), 
and 11 percentage points more in the lower-rated tranches (from Panel C, column 2: 1.188×0.1 −   27
9.23×0.25×0.1 = −11.2%). 
The results also suggest that market prices incorporate the ex post risk of outcome, but only 
during the boom years.  In both AAA and non-AAA rated tranches, the interaction between the log 
of the yield spread with HOT is negative and significant, although the effect is larger in magnitude 
in the AAA-rated sample.  In columns (6) and (7), we estimate the same sample with and without 
the yield variable to judge the extent to which adding pricing attenuates the effect of issuer size on 
ex post outcomes.  The results suggest a small attenuation effect, but only in the AAA-rated sample. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
  Our paper tests whether conflicts of interest affected ratings in one of the largest and fastest 
growing credit markets.  Rating agencies play a crucial role in the corporate bond market, and they 
were a key part of the rise and fall of the housing and MBS markets.  It is perhaps not surprising to 
see that analytical models used by rating agencies were imperfect.  Many sophisticated investors 
and policymakers systematically underestimated default risk in housing, particularly the risk that the 
whole U.S. housing market would decline simultaneously.  Our findings, however, suggest that 
mistakes were systematically correlated with issuer size and market conditions.  All three major 
rating agencies were more optimistic for securities sold by large issuers during the boom years. 
With a large sample of MBS tranches, we report evidence that deals sold by large issuers 
were structured more aggressively so that a greater fraction of funds were sold to the AAA market.  
This pattern suggests that large issuers aggressively asserted their bargaining power over the credit 
rating agencies.  We then show that initial yields on tranches sold by large issuers were higher 
conditional on the credit rating and other controls, indicating that investors understood how 
potential conflicts facing the agencies could change the information content of their ratings.  
Finally, for both AAA and non-AAA rated tranches sold by large issuers, their prices drop more   28
than similar tranches sold by smaller issuers when the ‘housing bubble’ began to unravel.  These 
performance differences are concentrated among deals packaged and sold during the market boom 
years of 2004 through 2006.  Finally, we find evidence that ratings-based regulations and regulatory 
arbitrage of financial institutions also distort the rating process, but controlling for these effects does 
not change our main results on issuer size.  Overall, we conclude that there is a robust relation 
between issuer size and the market prices of mortgage-backed securities conditional on ratings, and 
conflicts between the interests of issuers (who pay for ratings) versus those of investors (who 
consume ratings) may explain this relationship.  29
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 TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF MBS CHARACTERISTICS 
 
This table reports summary statistics of privately-issued MBS sold between 2000 and 2006. “Fraction AAA” 
is the principal amount of all AAA tranches in an MBS deal divided by the total principal amount of all 
tranches in the deal. For a tranche with floating coupon, “Initial Yield Spread” is the fixed markup over the 
reference rate specified at issuance (e.g. the 1-month LIBOR rate). For a tranche with fixed or variable coupon, 
“Initial Yield Spread” is the difference between the initial coupon rate and the yield of a Treasury security 
whose maturity is closest to the tranche’s weighted average life. “Price Change” is the percentage change in 
the price of a tranche between issuance and April 2009 (or its payoff date). “Issuer market share” is calculated 
as the number of deals originated by an issuer in the previous year divided by the total number of deals in the 
same year. “Hot MBS Market” is the fraction of total principal amounts of all tranches issued in any cohort 
year. “Fra. of Colla. in Troubled States” is the fraction of underlying collateral of each tranche originated in 
the states of Arizona, California, Florida, or Nevada. “Herfindahl Index of Collateral” is the sum of the 
squared shares of the collateral within a deal across each of the top five states (with the largest amount of 
mortgages), with the aggregation of all the other states as the sixth category. “Initial Rating” is the average of 
the ratings a tranche received at issuance, after we convert the ratings into a numerical value by setting AAA 
= 1, AA+=1.67, AA = 2, AA-=2.33, and so on; “Issuer Rating” is the average of the ratings the issuer has at 
issuance after converting the ratings into a numerical value using the same schedule. “Level of Subordination” 
is the fraction of tranches in the same MBS deal that have a rating the same as or better than a given tranche 
based on their principal amount. “Num Initial Ratings” is the number of different ratings a tranche received at 
issuance, which can equal 1 (if only one of Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch rated the tranche), 2, or 3. “Rating 
Disagreement” is a dummy that equals 1 if a tranche receives at least two ratings at issuance and the ratings 
are different from each other, and equals 0 otherwise (i.e., if all the ratings are the same). “Same Originator 
Servicer” is a dummy that equals 1 if the originator and the servicer of the deal are the same, and equals 0 
otherwise. “Types of Issuers” denote the nature of the issuers’ business, i.e., whether it is a commercial bank, 
an investment bank, a finance company, a thrift, or other mortgage specialists. “Deals with Floating Tranches” 
is a dummy that equals 1 if any of the tranches within a deal has a floating rate coupon at issuance, and equals 
0 otherwise. “Big” means that the market share of the issuer falls into the top 10% of the market share 
distribution in a given year, and “Small” refers to the rest of issuers in that year. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.   
 
Panel A: Overall Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std  p25  p75
Fraction AAA (in %)  5,548 88.73 93.79 13.08  82.97  97.18
Initial Yield Spread (in basis points)  65,895 147.07 120.00 447.63  51.49  185.00
Price Change (in %)  9,299 -14.90 -0.81 28.36  -24.01  0.03
Issuer Market Share  85,272 0.05 0.04 0.04  0.03  0.07
Hot MBS Market  86,635 0.17 0.19 0.06  0.11  0.25
Principal Amount (in Millions)  86,625 65.12 14.35 172.16  3.47  51.50
Weighted Average Life (in years)  70,484 5.63 4.90 3.36  3.28  7.26
Fra. of Colla. in Troubled States (in %)  80,536 45.51 45.70 16.51  34.70  54.90
Herfindahl Index of Collateral  80,536 0.34 0.33 0.09  0.29  0.36
Initial Rating  77,261 2.02 1.00 1.42  1.00  3.00
Issuer Rating  77,198 2.90 2.67 0.91  2.44  3.11
Number of Tranches in a Deal  5,910 14.66 14.00 10.33  8.00  19.00









Panel B: Description of Ratings Distribution 
 
 
Number of Tranches in Sample    Rating Agencies 
   Moody’s  S&P  Fitch 
AAA   30,390  38,169  21,930 
Non-AAA   21,090  26,858      12,148 
Total   51,480  65,027  34,078 
 
 
Num Initial Ratings  Freq.  Percent 
1 15,031  19.45 
2 51,136  66.19 
3 11,094  14.36 
Total 77,261  100.00 
 
 
Same Originator Servicer  Freq.  Percent 
0 (“different”)  14,872  35.49 
1 (“same”)  27,034  64.51 
Total 41,906  100.00 
 
 
Rating Disagreement  Freq.  Percent 
0 (“same”)  54,063  86.88 
1 (“different”)  8,167  13.12 
Total 62,230  100.00 
 
 
Types of Issuers  Freq.  Percent 
Commercial Banks  33,670  38.86 
Investment Banks  19,077  22.02 
Thrifts 17,388  20.07 
Finance Companies  8,013  9.25 
Others 8,487  9.80 
Total 86,635  100.00 
 
 
Deals with Floating Tranches  Freq.  Percent 
0 (“no”)  1,626  27.51 
1 (“yes”)  4,284  72.49 











Panel C: Distribution by Issuance Year and Issuer Size 
 
   2000-2003 2004-2006 
   Small Big Small  Big
    
Principal Amount (in 000s)  N  7,835 18,605 25,164  35,021
 Mean  68.06 54.15 74.44  63.59
 Median  17.50 12.00 16.56  12.75
 Std  158.07 133.53 206.51  165.76
    
Weighted Average Life (in years)  N  6,804 15,829 19,916  27,935
 Mean  5.90 6.68 4.99  5.44
 Median  5.13 5.78 4.79  4.76
 Std  3.53 3.97 2.60  3.28
    
Fra. of Colla. in Troubled States  N  7,027 17,436 23,114  32,959
 Mean  41.58 44.63 45.20  47.04
 Median  43.50 46.40 44.30  46.40
 Std  18.08 15.72 17.11  15.93
    
Herfindahl Index of Collateral  N  7,027 17,436 23,114  32,959
 Mean  0.34 0.36 0.33  0.34
 Median  0.33 0.34 0.31  0.32
 Std  0.10 0.10 0.09  0.08
    
Initial Rating  N  6,852 16,352 22,834  31,223
 Mean  1.87 1.71 2.24  2.04
 Median  1.00 1.00 1.67  1.00
 Std  1.30 1.24 1.46  1.47
    
Issuer Rating  N  5,797 18,605 17,766  35,030
 Mean  2.75 2.85 2.74  3.02
 Median  2.50 2.89 2.44  2.67
 Std  1.02 0.67 0.95  0.96
    
Fraction AAA  N  771 1,376 1,544  1,857
 Mean  90.25 92.11 85.67  88.13
 Median  94.19 96.52 88.41  93.92
 Std  11.21 11.97 12.26  14.50
    
Number of Tranches in a Deal  N 849 1,523 1,595  1,943
 Mean  9.23 12.22 15.78  18.03
 Median  7.00 9.00 15.00  16.00
 Std  8.93 10.96 7.85  10.74
    
Level of Subordination  N 7,260 17,587 24,687  34,121
 Mean  94.49 94.57 91.61  91.99
 Median  97.62 97.51 95.72  96.57




 Panel C: Distribution by Issuance Year and Issuer Size (continued) 
 
  Num Initial Ratings 2000-2003 2004-2006
  
Small Issuer  1  16.70% 15.36%
 2  67.67% 62.37%
 3  15.63% 22.27%
 Total  100.00% 100.00%
     
Big Issuer  1  21.90% 21.78%
 2  71.16% 66.05%
 3  6.94% 12.18%
 Total  100.00% 100.00%
 
 
 Same  Originator  Servicer 2000-2003 2004-2006
  
Small Issuer  0 (“different”)  36.31% 56.57%
 1  (“same”)  63.69% 43.43%
 Total  100.00% 100.00%
     
Big Issuer  0 (“different”)  17.54% 27.14%
 1  (“same”)  82.46% 72.86%
 Total  100.00% 100.00%
 
 
 Rating  Disagreement 2000-2003 2004-2006
  
Small Issuer  0 (“same”)  94.90% 78.84%
 1  (“different”)  5.10% 21.16%
 Total  100.00% 100.00%
     
Big Issuer  0 (“same”)  96.61% 86.27%
 1  (“different”)  3.39% 13.73%
 Total  100.00% 100.00%
 
 
Rating Disagreement    0 (“same”) 1  (“different”) Total 
        
 Small    82.50%  17.50%  100.00% 
        
 Big    89.82%  10.18%  100.00% 
        
χ
2 Test of Diff  703.36  p-value=0.00     
 
 Deals  with  Floating  Tranches 2000-2003 2004-2006
  
Small Issuer  0 (“no”)  29.68% 14.61%
 1  (“yes”)  70.32% 85.39%
 Total  100.00% 100.00%
      
Big Issuer  0 (“no”)  46.68% 22.13%
 1  (“yes”)  53.32% 77.87%
 Total  100.00% 100.00%
  
TABLE 2: TOP 10 ISSUERS OF PRIVATELY SOLD MBS (BY THE NUMBER OF DEALS) 
 
This table shows the top 10 issuers of privately-sold MBS sorted by the number of deals in each year of the sample period. The last row shows the 
total market share of the top 10 issuers in terms of the number of deals they issue in a given year. 
 
Rank  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
         
1  General Motors    General Motors  General Motors  General Motors  Countrywide Countrywide Countrywide 
         
2 Countrywide Credit  Suisse Countrywide Countrywide General  Motors  General  Motors General  Motors 
         
3 Wells  Fargo Countrywide  WaMu  Lehman Bear  Stearns Lehman Bear  Stearns 
         
4  JP Morgan Chase  Wells Fargo  Credit Suisse  Credit Suisse  Lehman  Bear Stearns  Lehman 
         
5  Bank of America  Lehman  Lehman  Bear Stearns  Bank of America  Bank of America  IndyMac 
         
6 Citigroup  Citigroup  Bank  of America  Bank of America  Credit Suisse  IndyMac  WaMu 
         
7  GreenPoint  Bank of America  Bear Stearns  WaMu  UBS  Credit Suisse  Goldman Sachs 
         
8  Lehman  Bear Stearns  Wells Fargo  Wells Fargo  Morgan Stanley  Goldman Sachs  JP Morgan Chase
         
9  GE  JP Morgan Chase Morgan Stanley  UBS  Wells Fargo  Merrill Lynch  Citigroup 
         
10  Conseco  WaMu  UBS  JP Morgan Chase Goldman Sachs  Morgan Stanley  Credit Suisse 
         
Market 
Share 
55.40% 68.12% 66.62% 64.25% 60.07% 59.17% 59.45% 
 
 TABLE 3: REGRESSION OF THE AAA FRACTION OF A DEAL ON MARKET SHARE OF ISSUER 
 
This table reports OLS regressions of the AAA-rated fraction of a privately-issued MBS deal on issuer market share, 
characteristics of the deals and issuers and market conditions. The sample includes all privately-issued deals 
originated between 2000 and 2006. The independent variable is the fraction of an MBS deal (based on principal 
amounts) that is rated AAA at issuance. “Market share of Issuer” is calculated as the number of deals originated by 
the issuer in the previous year divided by the total number of deals in the same year. Hot MBS Market (HOT) is the 
fraction of total principal amounts of all tranches issued in any cohort year. “Bank and Thrift” is a dummy that 
equals 1 if the issuer is a commercial bank or thrift, and equals 0 otherwise. “Post July 04” is a dummy that equals 1 
if the issuance date of the MBS deal is after July 31, 2004, and equals 0 otherwise. “Log of Principal” is the natural 
logarithm of the total principal amounts of all the tranches within a deal. “Log of Weighted Average Life” is the 
natural logarithm of the weighted average (based on principal amount) of each tranche’s weighted average life. 
“Missing Originator Servicer” is a dummy that equals 1 if either the originator or the servicer of the deal 
information is missing, and equals 0 otherwise. “Fra. of Colla. in Troubled States” and “Herfindahl Index of 
Collateral” are deal-level variables that represent the weighted average of the corresponding tranche-level 
characteristics as defined in Table 1 by using the principal amount of the tranches as the weights. All other 
independent variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are clustered by both cohort-year and issuer (two-way 
clustering). T statistics are in parentheses. Panel A presents regression results without issuer fixed effects; Panel B 
presents results with issuer fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.   
            
Panel A: Without Issuer Fixed Effects 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Market Share of Issuer  0.2107***  0.0157  0.1385**  0.0889  0.1466**  0.1066 
 (3.35)  (0.17)  (2.02)  (0.86)  (2.15)  (1.07) 
HOT * Market Share of Issuer  -  1.3424*  -  0.3508  -  0.2807 
 -  (1.95)  -  (0.54)  -  (0.45) 
Bank and Thrift  -0.0101  -0.0112  -0.0040  -0.0043  0.0006  0.0002 
 (-0.88)  (-0.93)  (-0.36)  (-0.37)  (0.05)  (0.01) 
Bank and Thrift * Post July 04  -  -  -  -  -0.0087  -0.0083 
 -  -  -  -  (-0.46)  (-0.43) 
Log of Principal  -0.0015  -0.0015  -0.0015  -0.0016  -0.0015  -0.0016 
 (-0.19)  (-0.19)  (-0.17)  (-0.18)  (-0.17)  (-0.18) 
Log of Weighted Average Life  0.0714**  0.0717**  0.0776**  0.0776**  0.0772**  0.0772** 
 (2.18)  (2.19)  (2.22)  (2.20)  (2.19)  (2.17) 
Deals with Floating Tranches  -0.0260**  -0.0263** -0.0281**  -0.0282**  -0.0281**  -0.0281** 
 (-2.25)  (-2.31)  (-2.24)  (-2.27)  (-2.22)  (-2.26) 
Fra. of Colla. in Troubled States  0.0006**  0.0006**  0.0006**  0.0006**  0.0006*  0.0006* 
 (2.34)  (2.16)  (2.19)  (2.04)  (1.94)  (1.78) 
Herfindahl Index of Collateral  -0.0174  -0.0172  -0.0359  -0.0356  -0.0347  -0.0345 
 (-0.49)  (-0.46)  (-0.88)  (-0.86)  (-0.83)  (-0.82) 
Same Originator Servicer  0.0211**  0.0196*  0.0189  0.0186  0.0192  0.0189 
 (2.05)  (1.83)  (1.63)  (1.58)  (1.63)  (1.60) 
Missing Originator Servicer  0.0231  0.0224  0.0176  0.0175  0.0178  0.0177 
 (1.58)  (1.53)  (1.18)  (1.17)  (1.21)  (1.20) 
Issuer Rating  -  -  0.0125***  0.0123**  0.0122**  0.0121** 
 -  -  (2.64)  (2.49)  (2.57)  (2.42) 
Cohort-Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 5,429  5,429  4,711  4,711  4,711  4,711 





      Panel B: With Issuer Fixed Effects 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Market Share of Issuer  -0.1140  -0.2114  -0.0860  -0.1470  -0.0843  -0.1409 
 (-0.62)  (-1.06)  (-0.34)  (-0.49)  (-0.34)  (-0.48) 
HOT * Market Share of Issuer  -  1.1477  -  0.5902  -  0.5488 
 -  (0.94)  -  (0.40)  -  (0.39) 
Bank and Thrift * Post July 04  -  -  -  -  -0.0125  -0.0123 
 -  -  -  -  (-0.57)  (-0.57) 
Log of Principal  0.0027  0.0029  0.0035  0.0035  0.0036  0.0036 
 (0.34)  (0.35)  (0.39)  (0.39)  (0.41)  (0.40) 
Log of Weighted Average Life  0.0746**  0.0750**  0.0789**  0.0790**  0.0783**  0.0784** 
 (2.27)  (2.25)  (2.30)  (2.30)  (2.28)  (2.28) 
Deals with Floating Tranches  -0.0252***  -0.0253** -0.0277*** -0.0278***  -0.0276***  -0.0277***
 (-2.61)  (-2.54)  (-2.85)  (-2.80)  (-2.79)  (-2.80) 
Fra. of Colla. in Troubled States  0.0005  0.0005*  0.0005  0.0005  0.0005  0.0005 
 (1.63)  (1.68)  (1.59)  (1.63)  (1.49)  (1.52) 
Herfindahl Index of Collateral  -0.0477  -0.0494  -0.0461  -0.0470  -0.0461  -0.0470 
 (-0.93)  (-0.96)  (-0.81)  (-0.82)  (-0.81)  (-0.82) 
Same Originator Servicer  0.0094  0.0090  0.0099  0.0098  0.0105  0.0103 
 (1.03)  (0.98)  (0.92)  (0.92)  (0.97)  (0.97) 
Missing Originator Servicer  0.0078  0.0079  0.0076  0.0076  0.0077  0.0077 
 (0.62)  (0.63)  (0.55)  (0.54)  (0.55)  (0.55) 
Issuer Rating  -  -  0.0029  0.0021  0.0007  -0.0000 
 -  -  (0.44)  (0.32)  (0.11)  (-0.00) 
Cohort-Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Issuer Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 5,429  5,429  4,711  4,711  4,711  4,711 
R-squared 0.207  0.208  0.188  0.188  0.189  0.189 
 TABLE 4: REGRESSION OF MBS YIELD SPREAD TO ISSUER SHARE 
 
This table reports OLS regressions of the yield spread (at issuance) of privately-issued MBS tranches on issuer market share, tranche-level 
characteristics, other issuer characteristics and market conditions. The sample includes all tranches for which we can observe initial coupons (or 
fixed spreads) on Bloomberg originated between 2000 and 2006 that received a rating from Moody’s, S&P, or Fitch. The dependent variable is 
ln (yield spread): for a tranche with floating coupon, yield spread is defined as the fixed markup over the benchmark rate specified at issuance 
(e.g. the 1-month LIBOR rate); for a tranche with fixed or variable coupon, yield spread is defined as the difference between the initial coupon 
rate and the yield of a corresponding treasury security whose maturity is closest to the tranche’s weighted average life. “Log of Number of 
Tranches” is the natural logarithm of the number of tranches in an MBS deal. “One Initial Rating” is a dummy that equals 1 if the number of 
reported ratings a tranche has at issuance is 1 (i.e., if only one of Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch rated the tranche), and equals 0 otherwise; “Two 
Initial Ratings” is a dummy that equals 1 if the number of different reported ratings a tranche has at issuance is 2; tranches with three reported 
ratings serve as the default group. “Initial Rating Category Dummies” are a set of dummies to indicate each level of the average ratings a given 
tranche received at issuance, after we convert the ratings into a numerical value by setting AAA = 1, AA+=1.67, AA = 2, AA-=2.33, and so on, 
and then take the arithmetic averages of the ratings the tranche receives. All other independent variables are described in previous tables (Table 
1 and Table 3). Each regression includes separate intercepts for coupon types (floating, fixed, or variable). Standard errors are clustered by both 
cohort-year and issuer (two-way clustering). T statistics are in parentheses. Panels A and B present results for AAA tranches only; Panels C and 
D present results for non-AAA tranches only. Panels A and C do not have issuer fixed effects, and panels B and D have issuer fixed effects. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   
 
Panel A: AAA Tranches Only, No Issuer Fixed Effects 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
Issuer Share  0.2891  -1.2301** 0.2247  -1.2073**  0.1904  -1.1930**  0.2060  -1.1207** 
 (0.53)  (-2.35)  (0.43)  (-2.21)  (0.36)  (-2.24)  (0.40)  (-2.12) 
HOT * Issuer Share  -  9.8987*** -  9.3310***  -  9.0203***  -  8.6405*** 
 -  (3.20)  -  (2.97)  -  (2.87)  -  (2.81) 
Bank and Thrift  -0.0163  -0.0407  -0.0429  -0.0657 -0.0457  -0.0677  -0.0462  -0.0672 
 (-0.35)  (-0.91)  (-1.09)  (-1.46)  (-1.18)  (-1.54)  (-1.17)  (-1.51) 
Bank and Thrift * Post July 04  0.0962**  0.1116*** 0.1417***  0.1559***  0.1431***  0.1569***  0.1446***  0.1576*** 
 (2.20)  (2.61)  (3.27)  (3.50)  (3.25)  (3.42)  (3.16)  (3.37) 
Level of Subordination  -  -  0.6736***  0.6718***  0.6645***  0.6629***  0.2417  0.2825 
 -  -  (4.79)  (4.71)  (4.31)  (4.26)  (0.95)  (1.04) 
HOT * Level of Subordination  -  -  -  -  -  -  2.3559  2.1199 
 -  -  -  -  -  -  (1.47)  (1.31) 
 Log of Principal  -0.0208**  -0.0210** -0.0041  -0.0044  -0.0028  -0.0032  -0.0022  -0.0026 
 (-2.20)  (-2.48)  (-0.46)  (-0.49)  (-0.32)  (-0.35)  (-0.24)  (-0.28) 
Log of Weighted Average Life  0.0082  0.0081  0.0106  0.0105  0.0108  0.0106  0.0110  0.0108 
 (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11) 
Log of Number of Tranches  -  -  0.1499***  0.1491***  0.1515***  0.1505***  0.1523***  0.1513*** 
 -  -  (5.32)  (4.88)  (5.12)  (4.75)  (5.14)  (4.80) 
Fra. of Colla. in Troubled States  0.0043**  0.0042**  0.0031**  0.0031**  0.0029**  0.0029*  0.0029**  0.0029* 
 (2.57)  (2.56)  (2.29)  (2.16)  (2.03)  (1.94)  (2.05)  (1.95) 
Herfindahl Index of Collateral  -0.3241  -0.3277  -0.3056* -0.3091* -0.2841*  -0.2885*  -0.2870*  -0.2909* 
 (-1.61)  (-1.60)  (-1.82)  (-1.78)  (-1.71)  (-1.67)  (-1.74)  (-1.71) 
Same Originator Servicer  0.0921***  0.0802*** 0.0717***  0.0605***  0.0712***  0.0605***  0.0679***  0.0580*** 
 (3.33)  (2.83)  (3.19)  (3.06)  (3.02)  (2.97)  (2.92)  (2.80) 
Missing Originator Servicer  0.0531  0.0500  0.0300  0.0272  0.0270  0.0245  0.0265  0.0241 
 (1.56)  (1.39)  (1.09)  (0.98)  (0.94)  (0.87)  (0.98)  (0.89) 
Issuer Rating  0.0099  0.0050  0.0201  0.0153  0.0218  0.0172  0.0217  0.0173 
 (0.53)  (0.26)  (1.08)  (0.82)  (1.17)  (0.90)  (1.17)  (0.92) 
One Initial Rating  -  -  -  -  0.0945 0.0891  0.0940 0.0889 
 -  -  -  -  (1.57)  (1.47)  (1.58)  (1.52) 
Two Initial Ratings  -  -  -  -  0.0775 0.0749  0.0770 0.0745 
 -  -  -  -  (1.06)  (1.03)  (1.05)  (1.03) 
Cohort-Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 25,129  25,129  25,129  25,129  25,129  25,129  25,129  25,129 
R-squared 0.717  0.718  0.729  0.729  0.729  0.730  0.730  0.730 
                
Joint Wald tests of “One Initial 
Ratings” and “Two Initial 
Ratings” (p-value) 











   Panel B: AAA Tranches Only with Issuer Fixed Effects 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
Issuer Share  0.6988  0.3832  0.3982  0.0167  0.4240  0.0737  0.3096  0.0496 
 (1.19)  (0.74)  (0.91)  (0.05)  (1.00)  (0.21)  (0.72)  (0.13) 
HOT * Issuer Share  -  2.6230*** -  3.1694**  -  2.9037*  -  2.1836 
 -  (2.72)  -  (2.04)  -  (1.71)  -  (1.18) 
Bank and Thrift * Post July 04  0.1397***  0.1411**  0.1717***  0.1735**  0.1730***  0.1747**  0.1760***  0.1772** 
 (2.75)  (2.53)  (3.02)  (2.45)  (3.01)  (2.39)  (3.01)  (2.35) 
Level of Subordination  -  -  0.6488***  0.6498***  0.6463***  0.6472***  0.2150  0.2285 
 -  -  (3.94)  (3.85)  (3.72)  (3.56)  (0.73)  (0.72) 
HOT * Level of Subordination  -  -  -  -  -  -  2.3951  2.3243 
 -  -  -  -  -  -  (1.32)  (1.26) 
Log of Principal  -0.0188**  -0.0188** -0.0036  -0.0035  -0.0026  -0.0026  -0.0021  -0.0021 
 (-2.34)  (-2.14)  (-0.46)  (-0.44)  (-0.33)  (-0.32)  (-0.26)  (-0.25) 
Log of Weighted Average Life  0.0104  0.0104  0.0120  0.0119  0.0123  0.0122  0.0124  0.0123 
 (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12) 
Log of Number of Tranches  -  -  0.1397***  0.1397***  0.1406***  0.1406***  0.1418***  0.1418*** 
 -  -  (5.64)  (4.93)  (5.42)  (4.95)  (5.56)  (5.01) 
Fra. of Colla. in Troubled States  0.0028  0.0028  0.0021  0.0022  0.0020  0.0020  0.0020  0.0020 
 (1.63)  (1.63)  (1.37)  (1.38)  (1.24)  (1.26)  (1.26)  (1.28) 
Herfindahl Index of Collateral  -0.1974  -0.2012  -0.1935 -0.1982 -0.1767  -0.1813  -0.1802  -0.1836 
 (-0.92)  (-0.94)  (-1.03)  (-0.98)  (-0.93)  (-0.90)  (-0.97)  (-0.94) 
Same Originator Servicer  0.1099***  0.1088*** 0.0912***  0.0899***  0.0907***  0.0895***  0.0875***  0.0867*** 
 (5.35)  (3.31)  (6.29)  (5.13)  (6.42)  (5.17)  (5.43)  (4.76) 
Missing Originator Servicer  0.0654*  0.0653*  0.0432  0.0431  0.0411  0.0411  0.0403  0.0403 
 (1.86)  (1.79)  (1.46)  (1.45)  (1.36)  (1.33)  (1.38)  (1.40) 
Issuer Rating  0.0774***  0.0740*** 0.0691***  0.0649***  0.0731***  0.0692***  0.0697***  0.0668*** 
 (3.30)  (2.76)  (2.95)  (2.60)  (3.02)  (2.72)  (2.84)  (2.61)   Panel B: Continued 
One Initial Rating  -  -  -  -  0.0720 0.0707  0.0711 0.0701 
 -  -  -  -  (1.00)  (0.98)  (1.00)  (0.99) 
Two Initial Ratings  -  -  -  -  0.0562 0.0556  0.0551 0.0547 
 -  -  -  -  (0.70)  (0.69)  (0.69)  (0.68) 
Cohort-Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Issuer Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 25,129  25,129  25,129  25,129  25,129  25,129  25,129  25,129 
R-squared 0.725  0.725  0.735  0.735  0.735  0.736  0.736  0.736 
                
Joint Wald tests of “One Initial 
Ratings” and “Two Initial 
Ratings” (p-value) 










Panel C: Non-AAA Tranches Only, No Issuer Fixed Effects 
 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
Issuer Share  0.3102  -1.0447*** 0.3885  -1.0788*** 0.3516  -1.1417***  0.3649  -1.1266***
 (1.00)  (-2.58)  (1.22)  (-2.58)  (1.08)  (-2.77)  (1.15)  (-2.81) 
HOT * Issuer Share  -  7.9147*** -  8.5619***  -  8.7421***  -  8.7311*** 
 -  (4.51)  -  (4.43)  -  (4.92)  -  (4.95) 
Bank and Thrift  -0.1179**  -0.1299** -0.1196**  -0.1325**  -0.1226**  -0.1356**  -0.1238**  -0.1368** 
 (-1.98)  (-1.98)  (-2.09)  (-2.43)  (-2.17)  (-2.38)  (-2.18)  (-2.23) 
Bank and Thrift * Post July 04  0.1669***  0.1759*** 0.1826***  0.1925***  0.1814***  0.1910***  0.1840***  0.1936*** 
 (2.83)  (2.91)  (3.16)  (3.73)  (3.27)  (3.83)  (3.34)  (3.81) 
Level of Subordination  -  -  0.2921***  0.2979***  0.2764***  0.2820***  -0.1496  -0.1427 
 -  -  (7.21)  (7.27)  (7.34)  (7.68)  (-0.80)  (-0.75) 
HOT * Level of Subordination  -  -  -  -  -  -  2.2327*  2.2262* 
 -  -  -  -  -  -  (1.75)  (1.72) 
Log of Principal  0.0335*  0.0334  0.0351*  0.0349  0.0424**  0.0422**  0.0427**  0.0425** 
 (1.66)  (1.56)  (1.71)  (1.56)  (2.42)  (2.08)  (2.24)  (2.22) 
 
Log of Weighted Average Life  -0.0821  -0.0835  -0.0926 -0.0942* -0.0875  -0.0899  -0.0892  -0.0916 
 (-1.42)  (-1.42)  (-1.64)  (-1.68)  (-1.58)  (-1.60)  (-1.58)  (-1.53) Log of Number of Tranches  -  -  0.0262  0.0268  0.0193  0.0198  0.0208  0.0213 
 -  -  (1.08)  (1.12)  (0.87)  (0.92)  (0.95)  (0.97) 
Fra. of Colla. in Troubled States  0.0010  0.0010  0.0008  0.0008  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007  0.0007 
 (0.84)  (0.84)  (0.67)  (0.60)  (0.53)  (0.54)  (0.55)  (0.53) 
Herfindahl Index of Collateral  0.0198  0.0078  0.0004 -0.0128 -0.0013  -0.0155  -0.0023 -0.0165 
 (0.19)  (0.08)  (0.00)  (-0.12)  (-0.01)  (-0.15)  (-0.02)  (-0.16) 
Same Originator Servicer  -0.0347  -0.0422*  -0.0330  -0.0410**  -0.0308  -0.0392*  -0.0314  -0.0397* 
 (-1.50)  (-1.86)  (-1.53)  (-2.02)  (-1.41)  (-1.85)  (-1.42)  (-1.83) 
Missing Originator Servicer  -0.0453**  -0.0474** -0.0423*** -0.0444*** -0.0392*** -0.0414**  -0.0395***  -0.0417** 
 (-2.33)  (-2.34)  (-2.74)  (-2.61)  (-2.60)  (-2.47)  (-2.64)  (-2.54) 
Issuer Rating  0.0194  0.0175  0.0187  0.0167  0.0172  0.0152  0.0174  0.0153 
 (1.50)  (1.26)  (1.56)  (1.37)  (1.54)  (1.30)  (1.54)  (1.35) 
One Initial Rating  -  -  -  -  0.0669 0.0676  0.0666 0.0673 
 -  -  -  -  (1.46)  (1.50)  (1.44)  (1.49) 
Two Initial Ratings  -  -  -  -  0.0480*** 0.0438**  0.0483*** 0.0441** 
 -  -  -  -  (2.79)  (2.17)  (2.60)  (2.43) 
Rating Disagreement  -  -  -  -  0.1055***  0.1077***  0.1051***  0.1073*** 
 -  -  -  -  (4.40)  (4.57)  (4.36)  (4.46) 
Cohort-Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Initial Rating Category Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 19,179  19,179  19,133  19,133  19,133  19,133  19,133  19,133 
R-squared 0.602  0.603  0.605  0.606  0.609  0.610  0.610  0.611 
                
Joint Wald tests of “One Initial 
Ratings” and “Two Initial 
Ratings” (p-value) 








 Panel D: Non-AAA Tranches Only with Issuer Fixed Effects 
 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
Issuer Share  0.9659  0.2688  0.8724  0.1397  0.8600  0.0563  0.7970  0.0262 
 (1.64)  (0.53)  (1.51)  (0.30)  (1.55)  (0.14)  (1.46)  (0.07) 
HOT * Issuer Share  -  5.9191*** -  6.2108***  -  6.8432***  -  6.5864*** 
 -  (2.83)  -  (3.39)  -  (4.20)  -  (3.71) 
Bank and Thrift * Post July 04  0.1717***  0.1732*** 0.1884***  0.1901***  0.1880***  0.1897***  0.1913***  0.1928*** 
 (2.90)  (3.11)  (3.32)  (3.61)  (3.43)  (3.82)  (3.44)  (3.86) 
Level of Subordination  -  -  0.3056***  0.3066***  0.2926***  0.2937***  -0.0995  -0.0820 
 -  -  (4.26)  (4.17)  (4.17)  (4.22)  (-0.53)  (-0.41) 
HOT * Level of Subordination  -  -  -  -  -  -  2.0605  1.9734 
 -  -  -  -  -  -  (1.56)  (1.51) 
Log of Principal  0.0326*  0.0328*  0.0331*  0.0333*  0.0409**  0.0412**  0.0412**  0.0414** 
 (1.67)  (1.73)  (1.75)  (1.68)  (2.36)  (2.24)  (2.33)  (2.01) 
Log of Weighted Average Life  -0.0867  -0.0868  -0.0944*  -0.0946  -0.0933*  -0.0939*  -0.0954*  -0.0959* 
 (-1.57)  (-1.56)  (-1.68)  (-1.64)  (-1.71)  (-1.70)  (-1.76)  (-1.79) 
Log of Number of Tranches      0.0121  0.0125  0.0024  0.0026  0.0039  0.0041 
     (0.44)  (0.42)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.15)  (0.13) 
Fra. of Colla. in Troubled States  0.0002  0.0002  0.0000  0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0001 
 (0.13)  (0.17)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (-0.13)  (-0.08)  (-0.13)  (-0.08) 
Herfindahl Index of Collateral  0.0977  0.0831  0.0841 0.0688 0.0876  0.0706  0.0857  0.0695 
 (0.91)  (0.74)  (0.77)  (0.61)  (0.84)  (0.67)  (0.82)  (0.60) 
Same Originator Servicer  0.0001  -0.0020  0.0019  -0.0002  -0.0008  -0.0032  -0.0012  -0.0034 
 (0.01)  (-0.16)  (0.21)  (-0.02)  (-0.08)  (-0.29)  (-0.11)  (-0.32) 
Missing Originator Servicer  -0.0238  -0.0235  -0.0209 -0.0206 -0.0220  -0.0217  -0.0225  -0.0222 
 (-1.42)  (-1.36)  (-1.41)  (-1.13)  (-1.37)  (-1.15)  (-1.40)  (-1.22) 
Issuer Rating  0.0628***  0.0586*** 0.0593***  0.0549***  0.0578***  0.0530***  0.0564***  0.0519*** 
 (3.28)  (3.49)  (3.05)  (3.37)  (2.75)  (3.00)  (2.64)  (2.85) 
One Initial Rating  -  -  -  -  0.0895**  0.0903**  0.0888**  0.0896** 
 -  -  -  -  (2.18)  (2.24)  (2.07)  (2.03) 
Two Initial Ratings  -  -  -  -  0.0415** 0.0397*  0.0415** 0.0397* 
 -  -  -  -  (2.04)  (1.94)  (2.05)  (1.90) 
 
 Rating Disagreement  -  -  -  -  0.1104***  0.1118***  0.1098***  0.1111*** 
 -  -  -  -  (4.20)  (4.35)  (4.12)  (4.22) 
Cohort-Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Issuer Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Initial Rating Category Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 19,179  19,179  19,133  19,133  19,133  19,133  19,133  19,133 
R-squared 0.613  0.613  0.616  0.616  0.620  0.621  0.621  0.621 
                
Joint Wald tests of “One Initial 
Ratings” and “Two Initial 
Ratings” (p-value) 










 TABLE 5: REGRESSION OF MBS PRICE CHANGE TO ISSUER SHARE 
 
This table reports OLS regressions of the change in the price of privately-issued MBS tranches on issuer market share, other issuer 
and tranche-level characteristics and market conditions. The sample includes all tranches for which we can observe prices on 
Bloomberg originated between 2000 and 2006 that received at least one rating from Moody’s, S&P, or Fitch. The dependent 
variable is the percentage change in the price of a tranche between issuance and April 2009 (or its payoff date). “Log of Yield 
Spread” is Log of yield spread at issuance. All other independent variables are described in previous tables (Table 1, Table 3, and 
Table 4). Each regression includes separate intercepts for coupon types (floating, fixed, or variable). Standard errors are clustered 
by both cohort-year and issuer (two-way clustering). T statistics are in parentheses. Panels A and B present results for AAA 
tranches only; Panels C and D show results for non-AAA tranches only. Panels A and C do not have issuer fixed effects, and panels 
B and D have issuer fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   
 
Panel A: AAA Tranches Only, No Issuer Fixed Effects 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Issuer Share  -0.3767  0.2962  0.4170**  0.4274**  0.3979**  0.4024**  0.1832 
 (-1.60)  (1.58)  (2.37)  (2.36)  (2.15)  (2.50)  (0.95) 
HOT * Issuer Share  -  -5.2555** -5.9520*** -5.7721***  -5.8203***  -5.3926**  -3.2683** 
 -  (-2.12)  (-2.73)  (-2.80)  (-2.74)  (-2.57)  (-2.09) 
Bank and Thrift  -0.0087  0.0049  0.0058  0.0076  0.0087  0.0051  0.0043 
 (-0.79)  (0.36)  (0.43)  (0.51)  (0.59)  (0.33)  (0.20) 
Bank and Thrift * Post July 04  0.0737*  0.0630*  0.0504*  0.0464*  0.0434*  0.0428  0.0291 
 (1.89)  (1.86)  (1.80)  (1.66)  (1.66)  (1.57)  (0.95) 
Level of Subordination  -  -  -0.1309*  -0.1349**  -0.0328  -0.0997  -0.0713 
 -  -  (-1.91)  (-2.12)  (-0.47)  (-1.34)  (-1.05) 
HOT * Level of Subordination  -  - -  -  -0.5736  -0.2901  -0.4069 
 -  -  -  -  (-1.04)  (-0.52)  (-0.88) 
Log of Yield Spread  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.0096 
 -  -  -  -  -  -  (-0.28) 
HOT * Log of Yield Spread  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.5516***
 -  -  -  -  -  -  (-4.29) 
Log of Principal  0.0002  -0.0011  -0.0014  -0.0017  -0.0019  0.0035  -0.0013 
 (0.02)  (-0.11)  (-0.15)  (-0.19)  (-0.21)  (0.39)  (-0.15) 
Log of Weighted Average Life  -0.1490***  -0.1490*** -0.1494*** -0.1494***  -0.1495***  -0.1496*** -0.0944** 
 (-4.73)  (-4.68)  (-4.59)  (-4.58)  (-4.40)  (-4.06)  (-2.50) 
Log of Number of Tranches      -0.0257  -0.0276  -0.0273  -0.0324  -0.0373 
     (-1.01)  (-1.09)  (-1.09)  (-1.14)  (-1.19) 
 Fra. of Colla. in Troubled States  -0.0002  -0.0002 -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0002 
 (-0.22)  (-0.16)  (-0.15)  (-0.15)  (-0.12)  (-0.14)  (-0.15) 
Herfindahl Index of Collateral  0.0641  0.0706 0.0888  0.0877  0.0837  0.0820 0.0756 
 (0.52)  (0.59)  (0.78)  (0.76)  (0.71)  (0.59)  (0.66) 
Same Originator Servicer  -0.0564**  -0.0474  -0.0440  -0.0408  -0.0402  -0.0401  -0.0325 
 (-2.29)  (-1.53)  (-1.49)  (-1.31)  (-1.29)  (-1.32)  (-1.02) 
Missing Originator Servicer  0.0146  0.0124  0.0125  0.0115  0.0112  0.0108  0.0046 
 (0.56)  (0.45)  (0.47)  (0.43)  (0.43)  (0.37)  (0.17) 
Issuer Rating  -0.0050  0.0008  0.0008  0.0017  0.0023  -0.0013  -0.0045 
 (-0.97)  (0.22)  (0.20)  (0.44)  (0.46)  (-0.19)  (-0.64) 
One Initial Rating  -  -  -  -0.0528 -0.0506  -0.0587 -0.0585 
 -  -  -  (-1.40)  (-1.32)  (-1.61)  (-1.13) 
Two Initial Ratings  -  -  -  -0.0142 -0.0142  -0.0225 -0.0194 
 -  -  -  (-0.79)  (-0.79)  (-1.22)  (-1.01) 
Cohort-Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 3,602  3,602  3,602  3,602  3,602  3,065  3,065 
R-squared 0.475  0.480  0.484  0.486  0.487  0.495  0.522 
 
 
Panel B: AAA Tranches Only with Issuer Fixed Effects 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Issuer Share  0.0202  0.1349  0.2144  0.1932  0.1768  0.0395  -0.0766 
 (0.07)  (0.37)  (0.58)  (0.53)  (0.49)  (0.14)  (-0.29) 
HOT * Issuer Share  -  -1.4695  -1.8858  -1.8296  -1.8266  0.0390  1.3946 
 -  (-0.69)  (-0.94)  (-0.87)  (-0.85)  (0.02)  (0.87) 
Bank and Thrift * Post July 04  0.0625  0.0634  0.0515  0.0511  0.0497  0.0409  0.0442 
 (1.34)  (1.35)  (1.15)  (1.17)  (1.15)  (0.97)  (1.07) 
Level of Subordination  -  -  -0.0957  -0.1018  -0.0616  -0.0848  -0.0484 
 -  -  (-1.27)  (-1.41)  (-0.91)  (-1.52)  (-0.92) 
HOT * Level of Subordination  -  - -  -  -0.2281  -0.1660  -0.3293 
 -  -  -  -  (-0.42)  (-0.30)  (-0.73) 
Log of Yield Spread  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.0019 
 -  -  -  -  -  -  (0.06) 
HOT * Log of Yield Spread  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.5812***
 -  -  -  -  -  -  (-4.58) 
Log of Principal  0.0001  0.0000  0.0004  0.0002  0.0002  0.0080  0.0032 
 (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.61)  (0.25) Log of Weighted Average Life  -0.1502***  -0.1501*** -0.1499*** -0.1501***  -0.1501***  -0.1469*** -0.0950***
 (-4.43)  (-4.44)  (-4.23)  (-4.25)  (-4.11)  (-3.67)  (-2.60) 
Log of Number of Tranches  -  -  -0.0079  -0.0090  -0.0088  -0.0106  -0.0156 
 -  -  (-0.51)  (-0.56)  (-0.54)  (-0.53)  (-0.68) 
Fra. of Colla. in Troubled States  0.0005  0.0005  0.0005  0.0005  0.0005  0.0007  0.0004 
 (0.45)  (0.42)  (0.45)  (0.43)  (0.43)  (0.68)  (0.41) 
Herfindahl Index of Collateral  0.1125  0.1149 0.1160  0.1147  0.1127  0.1145 0.1242 
 (0.83)  (0.84)  (0.87)  (0.86)  (0.81)  (0.73)  (0.89) 
Same Originator Servicer  -0.0139  -0.0136  -0.0132  -0.0119  -0.0115  -0.0080  -0.0025 
 (-0.46)  (-0.46)  (-0.44)  (-0.37)  (-0.35)  (-0.21)  (-0.07) 
Missing Originator Servicer  0.0065  0.0063  0.0083  0.0086  0.0085  0.0061  0.0045 
 (0.28)  (0.26)  (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.33)  (0.21)  (0.18) 
Issuer Rating  0.0219*  0.0219*  0.0228*  0.0226*  0.0230*  0.0257*  0.0285** 
 (1.73)  (1.73)  (1.79)  (1.88)  (1.71)  (1.82)  (2.14) 
One Initial Rating  -  -  -  -0.0358 -0.0350  -0.0383 -0.0374 
 -  -  -  (-0.85)  (-0.75)  (-0.88)  (-0.74) 
Two Initial Ratings  -  -  -  -0.0056 -0.0055  -0.0146 -0.0131 
 -  -  -  (-0.26)  (-0.24)  (-0.62)  (-0.55) 
Cohort-Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Issuer Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 3,602  3,602  3,602  3,602  3,602  3,065  3,065 
R-squared 0.514  0.515  0.516  0.517  0.517  0.531  0.555 
 
Panel C: Non-AAA Tranches Only, No Issuer Fixed Effects 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Issuer Share  -0.0502  1.1878*** 1.1896***  1.2137***  1.1607***  0.3590  0.3908 
 (-0.15)  (3.41)  (3.60)  (4.06)  (3.39)  (0.79)  (1.03) 
HOT * Issuer Share  -  -9.2287*** -9.0623*** -9.4488***  -8.9954***  -6.6979*** -6.1320***
 -  (-4.83)  (-4.98)  (-6.04)  (-5.45)  (-2.71)  (-2.92) 
Bank and Thrift  -0.0238  -0.0165  -0.0164  -0.0157  -0.0157  -0.0029  0.0001 
 (-0.86)  (-0.67)  (-0.65)  (-0.64)  (-0.64)  (-0.14)  (0.00) 
Bank and Thrift * Post July 04  -0.0445  -0.0507  -0.0483  -0.0484  -0.0469  -0.0581**  -0.0596** 
 (-1.21)  (-1.52)  (-1.41)  (-1.45)  (-1.37)  (-2.22)  (-2.31) 
Level of Subordination  -  -  0.0296  0.0312  -0.0809  -0.1477  -0.2626 
 -  -  (0.72)  (0.67)  (-0.43)  (-0.86)  (-1.28) 
HOT * Level of Subordination  -  -  -  -  0.6280  0.8871  1.4212 
 -  -  -  -  (0.67)  (0.91)  (1.31) Log of Yield Spread  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.1241** 
 -  -  -  -  -  -  (2.14) 
HOT * Log of Yield Spread  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.5828** 
 -  -  -  -  -  -  (-2.40) 
Log of Principal  -0.0205*  -0.0218*  -0.0203*  -0.0189  -0.0187  -0.0264*  -0.0285** 
 (-1.75)  (-1.75)  (-1.66)  (-1.50)  (-1.49)  (-1.90)  (-2.17) 
Log of Weighted Average Life  -0.1671***  -0.1622*** -0.1619*** -0.1558**  -0.1565**  -0.1518**  -0.1573** 
 (-2.76)  (-2.72)  (-2.67)  (-2.51)  (-2.52)  (-2.08)  (-2.27) 
Log of Number of Tranches  -  -  -0.0027  -0.0000  0.0003  0.0035  0.0075 
 -  -  (-0.12)  (-0.00)  (0.01)  (0.16)  (0.36) 
Fra. of Colla. in Troubled States  0.0012  0.0013  0.0013  0.0012  0.0012  0.0012  0.0012 
 (1.17)  (1.29)  (1.34)  (1.27)  (1.15)  (1.28)  (1.28) 
Herfindahl Index of Collateral  -0.2233  -0.2085 -0.2071  -0.2001  -0.1975  -0.1773  -0.2175 
 (-1.12)  (-1.10)  (-1.07)  (-1.04)  (-1.02)  (-0.96)  (-1.15) 
Same Originator Servicer  -0.0487**  -0.0419*  -0.0415**  -0.0447**  -0.0451**  -0.0257  -0.0240 
 (-1.99)  (-1.91)  (-2.00)  (-2.11)  (-2.17)  (-1.28)  (-1.30) 
Missing Originator Servicer  0.0200  0.0166  0.0169  0.0167  0.0170  0.0108  0.0122 
 (1.45)  (1.27)  (1.19)  (1.15)  (1.02)  (0.60)  (0.68) 
Issuer Rating  -0.0026  -0.0027  -0.0033  -0.0042  -0.0042  -0.0104  -0.0128 
 (-0.25)  (-0.33)  (-0.35)  (-0.50)  (-0.49)  (-1.01)  (-1.15) 
One Initial Rating  -  -  -  0.0425 0.0401  0.0606**  0.0588** 
 -  -  -  (1.33)  (1.17)  (2.46)  (2.55) 
Two Initial Ratings  -  -  -  0.0077 0.0071  0.0152 0.0156 
 -  -  -  (0.38)  (0.35)  (1.24)  (0.98) 
Rating Disagreement  -  -  -  -0.0008  -0.0013  0.0072  0.0050 
 -  -  -  (-0.05)  (-0.08)  (0.52)  (0.31) 
Cohort-Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Initial Rating Category Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 2,624  2,624  2,614  2,614  2,614  2,330  2,330 
R-squared 0.610  0.616  0.616  0.617  0.618  0.563  0.572 
 
 Panel D: Non-AAA Tranches Only with Issuer Fixed Effects 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)   
Issuer Share  -0.3682  0.5423  0.5750  0.6779*  0.6293  -0.4490  -0.5414 
 (-0.84)  (1.44)  (1.50)  (1.75)  (1.50)  (-0.96)  (-1.12) 
HOT * Issuer Share  -  -9.9492*** -9.9244*** -10.3939***  -9.8894***  -9.3540*** -7.9951***
 -  (-3.06)  (-2.98)  (-3.50)  (-3.39)  (-3.71)  (-3.24) 
Bank and Thrift * Post July 04  -0.0680*  -0.0582*  -0.0588  -0.0609*  -0.0582  -0.0579*  -0.0585** 
 (-1.93)  (-1.64)  (-1.53)  (-1.67)  (-1.47)  (-1.86)  (-2.05) 
Level of Subordination  -  -  -0.0157  -0.0127  -0.1212  -0.1869  -0.3232 
 -  -  (-0.31)  (-0.24)  (-0.58)  (-1.12)  (-1.63) 
HOT * Level of Subordination  -  -  -  -  0.6170  0.9290  1.6175 
 -  -  -  -  (0.59)  (1.05)  (1.60) 
Log of Yield Spread  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.1318** 
 -  -  -  -  -  -  (2.11) 
HOT * Log of Yield Spread  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.5797** 
 -  -  -  -  -  -  (-2.29) 
Log of Principal  -0.0178  -0.0165  -0.0161  -0.0140  -0.0138  -0.0171  -0.0185 
 (-1.58)  (-1.47)  (-1.51)  (-1.23)  (-1.24)  (-1.25)  (-1.45) 
Log of Weighted Average Life  -0.1213  -0.1217 -0.1249  -0.1173  -0.1174  -0.1367  -0.1341 
 (-1.43)  (-1.45)  (-1.43)  (-1.36)  (-1.41)  (-1.43)  (-1.43) 
Log of Number of Tranches  -  -  -0.0171  -0.0156  -0.0157  0.0023  0.0034 
 -  -  (-0.72)  (-0.69)  (-0.76)  (0.11)  (0.16) 
Fra. of Colla. in Troubled States  0.0024**  0.0023**  0.0023**  0.0024**  0.0023**  0.0016  0.0016 
 (2.10)  (2.08)  (2.09)  (2.14)  (2.02)  (1.27)  (1.31) 
Herfindahl Index of Collateral  -0.2015  -0.1845 -0.1898  -0.1828  -0.1792  -0.0941  -0.1379 
 (-0.92)  (-0.82)  (-0.85)  (-0.81)  (-0.79)  (-0.45)  (-0.66) 
Same Originator Servicer  -0.0239  -0.0211  -0.0203  -0.0207  -0.0220  -0.0066  -0.0071 
 (-0.96)  (-1.06)  (-1.00)  (-0.99)  (-1.04)  (-0.33)  (-0.37) 
Missing Originator Servicer  0.0237  0.0216  0.0233  0.0220  0.0223  0.0132  0.0141 
 (1.33)  (1.12)  (1.16)  (1.09)  (1.04)  (0.66)  (0.75) 
Issuer Rating  0.0230**  0.0194**  0.0166  0.0174  0.0177  0.0216  0.0152 
 (2.26)  (1.99)  (1.53)  (1.60)  (1.62)  (1.44)  (0.95) 
One Initial Rating  -  -  -  0.0527 0.0498  0.0789***  0.0708** 
 -  -  -  (1.34)  (1.11)  (2.89)  (2.49) 
Two Initial Ratings  -  -  -  0.0115 0.0108  0.0254* 0.0234 
 -  -  -  (0.62)  (0.56)  (1.88)  (1.60) 
 Rating Disagreement  -  -  -  0.0114  0.0110  0.0169  0.0131 
 -  -  -  (0.58)  (0.54)  (0.86)  (0.59) 
Cohort-Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Issuer Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Initial Rating Category Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 2,624  2,624  2,614  2,614  2,614  2,330  2,330 
R-squared 0.642  0.646  0.646  0.647  0.647  0.603  0.611 
 Figure 1: Fraction of AAA Tranches of Privately Sold MBS  
(sorted by Issuing Year and Issuer Market Share) 
 
This figure shows the median fraction of AAA tranches of privately-issued MBS deals sorted 
by issuing year (cohort) and issuer market share. The sample includes all MBS deals whose 
tranches received ratings from Moody’s, S&P, or Fitch. “Fraction of AAA Tranches in a 
Deal” is the principal amount of all the AAA tranches in an MBS deal divided by the total 
principal amount of all tranches in that deal. Issuer market share is calculated as the number of 
deals originated by the issuer divided by the total number of deals in the current year. “Big 
issuer” means that the market share of the issuer falls into the top 10% of the market share 
distribution in that year, and “Small issuer” refer to the rest of issuers in that year. 
 
 
 Figure 2: Initial Yield Spreads of Privately Sold Mortgage-Backed Securities  
(sorted by Issuing Year and Issuer Market Share) 
 
This figure shows the median initial yield spreads of privately-issued MBS tranches sorted by 
issuing year (cohort) and issuer market share. The sample includes all tranches for which we 
can observe initial coupons (or fixed spreads) on Bloomberg originated between 2000 and 
2006 that received at least one rating from Moody’s, S&P, or Fitch. For a tranche with 
floating coupon, the yield spread is defined as the fixed markup over the benchmark rate 
specified at issuance (e.g. the 1-month LIBOR rate). For a tranche with fixed or variable 
coupon, yield spread is defined as the difference between the initial coupon rate and the yield 
on a Treasury security whose maturity is closest to the tranche’s weighted average life. Issuer 
market share is calculated as the number of deals originated by the issuer divided by the total 
number of deals in the current year. “Big issuer” means that the market share of the issuer falls 
into the top 10% of the market share distribution in that year, and “Small issuer” refer to the 
rest of issuers in that year. 
 
 
 Figure 3: Monthly Price Changes of Privately Sold MBS   
(sorted by Issuer Market Share and Issuing Year) 
 
This figure shows the change in the monthly price of privately-issued MBS tranches sorted by issuer 
market share, calculated as the number of deals sold by the issuer divided by the total number of deals in 
the current year. “Big issuer” means that the market share of the issuer falls into the top 10% of the market 
share distribution in that year, and “Small issuer” refer to the rest of issuers in that year. The sample 
includes all tranches for which we can observe prices on Bloomberg originated between 2000 and 2006. 
The price history starts from the month of issuance to the month that the security stops trading or April 
2009, whichever comes first. Figure 3 (a) shows median prices for tranches originated between 2000 and 
2003, and Figure 3 (b) shows median prices for tranches originated between 2004 and 2006. 
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